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I. INTRODUCTION
Concern about drug abuse is not a new topic in this country, but it
has recently received considerable, perhaps unprecedented, attention.'
In its 1991 National Household Survey on Drug Abuse, the National
Institute on Drug Abuse identified an estimated 12.6 million current
drug users in the United States.2 The White House asserts that drug
abuse in the United States represents an "epidemic" greater than that
ever experienced by any industrialized nation.3 Drug abuse is often asso-
ciated with criminal acts.' It has adverse effects on the drug abuser and
1. See, eg., THE WHrE HOUSE, NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY (1991) [herein-
after THE WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY III]; THE WHITE HOUSE,
NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY (1990) [hereinafter THE WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL
DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY II]; THE WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY
(1989) [hereinafter THE WHrrE HOUSE, NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY I]; CONFER-
ENCE OF STATE COURT ADMINISTRATORS, RESOLUTION III: IN SUPPORT OF A JUDICIAL
SYSTEM RESPONSE TO THE DRUG PROBLEM IN THE UNITED STATES (1989); NATIONAL
COUNCIL OF JUVENILE AND FAMILY COURT JUDGES, DRUGS: THE AMERICAN FAMILY IN
CRISIS, 39 RECOMMENDATIONS (1987-88); L.L. Cregler, Adverse Health Consequences of Co-
caine Abuse, 81 J. NAT'L MED. ASS'N 27 (1989).
2. THE WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY 14 (1992).
3. THE WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY I, supra note 1, at 5.
4. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, DRUGS AND CRIME
FACTS, 1989, at 7 (1990). In about 36% of violent crime incidents, victims reported that they
believed their assailants were under the influence of drugs or alcohol. In 43% of violent
crimes, however, the victims reported that they did not know if the offender was under the
influence of drugs or alcohol. Id.
Violence related to drugs has increased significantly in the past few years, with many
jurisdictions reporting that one-third to over one-half of their homicides were drug related.
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FY 1988 REPORT ON DRUG CON-
TROL iii (1989). Between 1974 and 1986, the proportion of state prisoners under the influence
of an illegal drug at the time of the offense for which they were incarcerated grew from 25% to
35%. Id. at 7. More than 70% of the male and female arrestees in San Diego, New York,
Philadelphia and Washington, D.C., tested positive for one or more drugs. NATIONAL INST.
OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, DRUG USE FORECASTING: JANUARY TO MARCH 1989,
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on other individuals with whom the drug abuser associates, such as the
individual's children and spouse.' While emphasis has been placed on
the importance of providing treatment,6 most drug abusers do not them-
selves seek treatment; of those who do, many lack the incentive to either
at 4 (1989); see also Albert R. Roberts, Substance Abuse Among Men Who Batter Their Mates:
The Dangerous Mix, 5 J. SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT 83, 83 (1988) (stating that majority
of men who batter women are reported to have alcohol or drug problems). But cf MARCIA R.
CHAIKEN & BRUCE D. JOHNSON, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CHARACTERISTICS OF DIFFERENT
TYPES OF DRUG-INVOLVED OFFENDERS 3 (1988) (stating that although adult drug users con-
stitute bulk of population dealt with by criminal justice practioners, most adult drug users do
not engage in other illegal behavior and most of those who do commit crimes are not violent
and commit crimes at low rates).
5. See JAMES J. COLLINS & MARIANNE W. ZAwrrz, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL
DRUG DATA FOR NATIONAL POLICY (1990). Drug abuse can have a wide range of adverse
health, economic and social consequences. Many drug users do not participate in the legiti-
mate economy, have health problems and die from overdoses. Id at 9. Drug abuse disrupts
families, and drug trafficking disrupts the quality of life in neighborhoods. Id.
The adverse consequences of drug abuse are serious, not only to the individual user but to
society as a whole. Society suffers the burden of increased crime, violence, public corruption,
reduced economic productivity and various other social ills. COMPTROLLER GEN. OF THE
U.S., CONTROLLING DRUG ABUSE: A STATUS REPORT 3 (1988). The estimated cost of drug
abuse to the United States during 1983 was $59.7 billion, excluding social costs-such as fam-
ily conflict, suicide and the value of illicit drugs consumed. Id, Commentators have noted:
Maternal drug and/or alcohol abuse is known to be one of the critical factors in-
volved in the abuse, neglect and perhaps even the abandonment of children. In addi-
tion to the chaotic lifestyle and physical discomforts of addiction which inevitably
place the drug dependent women at high-risk for parenting problems, they must also
cope with numerous financial, social and psychological difficulties.
Diane 0. Regan et al., Infants of Drug Addicts: At Risk for Child Abuse, Neglect, and Place-
ment in Foster Care, 9 NEUROTOXICOLOGY & TERATOLOGY 315, 315 (1987); see also AMERI-
CAN PUB. WELFARE AW5'N, CHILDREN OF SUBSTANCE ABUSING/ALCOHOLIC PARENTS
REFERRED TO THE PUBLIC CHILD WELFARE SYSTEM: SUMMARIES OF KEY STATISTICAL
DATA OBTAINED FROM STATES (Final Report) (1990) (finding that problems related to young
children with drug-addicted/alcoholic parents have dramatically increased in recent years and
effects of parental drug involvement on drug dependent babies and children placed in substi-
tute care as result of parental drug abuse are devastating); Edward W. Lempinen, Crack Chaos
in New York's Family Courts, 1989 BRIEFLY 7, 7 ("The crack epidemic is destroying thousands
of New York City families, and family law specialists are finding it almost impossible to put
them back together again."); Ina Aronow, Rise in Child Abuse Tied to Drugs, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 2, 1989, at C24 (finding increased levels of drug use to be most significant factor in
increased number of child abuse cases); Jordana Hart, Child Abuse Found Tied to Drug Use:
Study Looks at Hub Cases, BOSTON GLOBE, June 2, 1989, at 23 (stating that alcohol and drug
use are at least partially responsible for rise in child abuse cases); Dan Andrews, More Than 1
in 4 Child Abuse Deaths Linked to Parental Drug Use, UPI, May 4, 1989 (linking crack use by
pregnant women to more than one-fourth of New York's suspected child abuse fatalities),
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File.
6. See, eg., THE WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY III, supra note
1, at 45-56; P. Crowley, Family Therapy Approach to Addiction, 40 BULL. ON NARCOTICS 57
(1988).
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obtain complete treatment or abstain from drug use after the treatment
has been completed.7
Recent attention has been devoted to developing strategies to pres-
sure drug abusers to undergo and maintain enrollment in treatment pro-grams.' Federal entities responsible for coordinating the national
response to drug abuse have recommended civil commitment as a means
for addressing the treatment needs of drug abusers.9 This alternative to
criminal conviction and incarceration typically involves hospitalization
of the drug abuser for purposes of treatment, care or rehabilitation. 10
Involuntary civil commitment of a drug dependent person (DD) 1
may be used in lieu of a criminal prosecution or as a dispositional alter-
native at sentencing after an individual has been charged with a criminal
offense-often drug-related in nature. Involuntary civil commitment
may also be initiated, however, without the individual having been
charged with a crime or otherwise having become involved with the
criminal justice system. An overloaded criminal justice system that can-
not adequately respond to increased drug abuse-related criminal offenses,
and perceptions that the criminal justice system may not be the appropri-
ate means for responding to drug abusers, has highlighted the potential
of civil commitment as an important and distinct alternative for dealing
with drug abuse. There are limitations, however, on the state's authority
to impose confinement, even for purposes of treatment.12
Although only recently suggested as an innovative response to drug
abuse,13 civil commitment of drug abusers has a relatively long history.
7. THE WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY III, supra note 1, at 46.
8. Id at 55.
The 1989 "Treatment Outcome Prospective Study," conducted by the Research Tri-
angle Institute, found that those under legal pressure to undergo treatment tended to
do as well as or better than those who sought treatment on their own. They may do
better in part because legal pressure keeps an addict in treatment for a longer period
of time, and virtually all studies agree that the longer an addict receives treatment,
the better are the chances for long-term success.
Id
9. See THE WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY II, supra note I, at
36; THE WHrrE HOUSE, NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 5
(1989); White House Fact Sheet on the National Drug Control Strategy (Sept. 5, 1989), in 25
WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 1308 (1989).
10. See, ag., THE WHrrE HOUSE, NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY III, supra note
1, at 55; THE WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY I, supra note 1, at 42.
11. "DDC" is used throughout this Article to refer to the procedure by which drug depen-
dent persons are involuntarily committed.
12. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425 (1979); O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S.
563, 575 (1975).
13. See THE WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY I, supra note 1, at
42-43.
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For example, in 1914 the State of New York enacted a statute that read:
"The constant use by any person of any habit-forming drug, [with listed
exceptions] . . . is hereby declared to be dangerous to the public
health."14 The statute also provided that "upon complaint to a magis-
trate and after due notice and hearing, the magistrate shall, if the person
is found to be addicted to the use of a habit-forming drug, commit such
person to a state, county or city hospital."1 "
During the 1960s a number of states, as well as the federal govern-
ment, implemented civil commitment procedures specifically aimed at
drug abusers. 6 Some of this activity may be attributable to a U.S.
Supreme Court opinion that suggested the Court's approval of DDC
schemes.7 Subsequently, a number of scholarly articles explored these
commitment schemes.1 8
Following this initial flurry of activity, however, scholars gave DDC
little attention, perhaps because such procedures were infrequently used.
In addition, although most states currently have the means to institute
civil commitment proceedings for drug abuse,1 9 state and local officials
may be unaware of its availability or may fail to utilize it.20 Perhaps
because of its limited use, there have not been a large number of judicial
opinions addressing involuntary civil commitment for drug abuse. Nev-
14. Public Health Law, ch. 363, 1914 N.Y. Laws art. XI-A, quoted in People v. City of
Buffalo, 216 N.Y.S. 468, 470 (Sup. Ct. 1926).
15. Id. Other states also have a history of using civil commitment for drug abusers. See,
e.g., In re Goldie, 35 Cal. App. 341, 169 P. 925 (1917).
16. See In re James, 283 N.Y.S.2d 126, 131 (Sup. Ct.), rev'd sub nom. In re Narcotic
Addiction Control Comm'n, 285 N.Y.S.2d 793 (App. Div. 1967), rev'd sub nom. Narcotic
Addiction Control Comm'n v. James, 240 N.E.2d 29 (N.Y. 1968); Dennis S. Aronowitz, Civil
Commitment of Narcotic Addicts, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 405, 407 (1967).
17. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 664, reh'g denied, 371 U.S. 905 (1962); see also
Ortega v. Rasor, 291 F. Supp. 748 (S.D. Fla. 1968) (authorizing states to establish programs of
compulsory treatment, including involuntary confinement, for persons addicted to narcotics);
Narcotic Addiction Control Comm'n v. James, 240 N.E.2d 29, 34 (N.Y. 1968) (stating that
state may compel individual to submit to rehabilitative confinement provided notice and op-
portunity to be heard is given).
18. See, e.g., Aronowitz, supra note 16; Lionel H. Frankel, Narcotic Addiction, Criminal
Responsibility, and Civil Commitment, 1966 UTAH L. REv. 581 (1966); David J. Huberty,
Civil Commitment of the Narcotic Addict, 18 CRIME & DELINQ. 99 (1972); Roland W. Wood,
18,000 Addicts Later: A Look at California's Civil Addict Program, 37 FED. PROBATION 26
(1973); Russell H. Carpenter, Jr., Note, Civil Commitment of Narcotic Addicts, 76 YALE L.J.
1160 (1967); Robert B. Cash, Note, Narcotics Addiction: Civil Commitment and the Report of
the President's Advisory Committee, 39 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 689 (1964).
19. See infra notes 50-52 and accompanying text.
20. See Ingo Keilitz et al., Involuntary Civil Commitment of Drug Addicts: A National
Survey 5 (1991) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the National Center for State Courts).
The failure to utilize civil commitment proceedings is apparently not a new phenomenon. See
Aronowitz, supra note 16, at 406.
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ertheless, because of the wide availability21 and recent calls for increased
utilization of involuntary civil commitment,22 it is important to examine
carefully the legal rulings regarding its use.23
II. GENERAL JUDICIAL PERCEPTIONS OF INVOLUNTARY CIVIL
COMMITMENT OF DRUG DEPENDENT PERSONS (DDC)
A. Federal Versus State Jurisdiction
The commitment and treatment of drug dependent persons is con-
sidered primarily the responsibility of the states.24 Most states, either
directly through statutory provisions that deal with drug dependent per-
sons, or indirectly by including drug dependency as a form of mental
illness, provide for the involuntary commitment and treatment of such
persons." Although most DDCs appear to arise pursuant to state statu-
tory law,26 federal law also can be used for the commitment of drug de-
pendent persons through the procedures established by the Federal
Narcotic Addict Rehabilitation Act (NARA) of 1966.27
Under NARA the federal commitment process, triggered by a peti-
tion to a United States District Court by a U.S. Attorney, is to be initi-
ated only in the absence of "appropriate state or other facilities."28
21. See Sandra Anderson Garcia & Ingo Keilitz, Involuntary Civil Commitment of Drug
Dependent Persons With Special Reference to Pregnant Women, 15(4) MENTAL & PHYSICAL
DIA.ITY L. REP. 418, 418 (1991).
22. See supra notes 9-10.
23. A distinction is sometimes made between various types of drug abusers. For example,
separate procedural schemes are sometimes established for alcoholics. See, eg., MASS. ANN.
LAWS ch. 11lB, §§ 1-13 (Alcoholism Treatment and Rehabilitation Law, establishing pro-
gram specifically for treatment of alcoholics); MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-24-301 to -306 (estab-
lishing procedures for voluntary treatment of, and involuntary commitment of, alcoholics).
For the most part, however, the analysis used by the judiciary in reviewing civil commit-
ment schemes for alcoholics has differed little from that used for substance abuse in general.
See, eg., In re Heurung, 446 N.W.2d 694, 695-96 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989) ("[I]nvoluntary
commitment is justified when the proposed patient, due to the habitual and excessive use of
alcohol or drugs, is incapable of 'self management' . . . ." (quoting MINN. STAT. § 253B.02(2)
(1988))). For this reason, when applicable to drug abusers in general, cases addressing the civil
commitment of alcoholics have been incorporated within this Article. In addition, the civil
commitment statutes of several states include individuals with mental illness and substance
abuse, without distinction within the population subject to civil commitment proceedings. See,
e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 12-7-2-130(1) (Bums Supp. 1992); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 34-B,
§ 3801(5) (West 1988); VA. CODE ANN. § 37.1-1 (Michie 1990). To the extent that judicial
opinions discussing these procedural schemes do not highlight or distinguish their applicability
to individuals who engage in drug abuse, those opinions are not included in this Article.
24. See infra notes 50-52 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 50-52 and accompanying text.
26. See Keilitz et al., supra note 20, at 5.
27. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3401-3442 (1988).
28. Id. § 3412(b).
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United States v. Gillespie2 9 established the prerequisite condition that
state facilities be unavailable. In Gillespie, the district court cited a con-
gressional report on NARA which explained that
the requirement that the U.S. attorney consider the availability
of state or local facilities before petitioning to commit the al-
leged addict to Federal facilities is to ensure that the Federal
commitment procedure will not preempt the primary responsi-
bility of those states which are equipped to handle some or all
of their addiction problems.30
Although it is designed as a backup to state DDC procedures, and
notwithstanding its infrequent use,31 the federal process has spawned a
number of judicial opinions that will be discussed in detail below.
B. Purpose of DDC
State legislatures have stated a wide range of purposes for establish-
ing DDC.32 From the perspective of the courts, however, two fundamen-
tal purposes underlie DDC. A primary purpose is to treat persons who
are dependent or in imminent danger of becoming dependent on drugs so
that they can again become productive members of society.3 3 In other
words, DDC is designed principally to benefit the individual. A second
purpose of DDC is to provide a benefit to society.34 One court has inter-
preted DDC as providing "citizens with the means of protecting them-
selves from those persons suffering from alcohol or drug related
problems, as well as at the same time helping those, who because of their
problem, are unable to help themselves."' 35 Other courts have stated that
29. 345 F. Supp. 1236 (W.D. Mo. 1972).
30. 111 at 1239 (quoting H.R. CONF. REP. No. 2316, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1966),
reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4245, 4265).
3 1. See supra note 20.
32. See Garcia & Keilitz, supra note 21, at 420.
33. See People v. Ortiz, 61 Cal. 2d 249, 255, 391 P.2d 163, 167, 37 Cal. Rptr. 891, 895
(1964); People v. Martinez, 106 Cal. App. 3d 524, 538, 165 Cal. Rptr. 160, 169 (1980); see also
In re De La 0, 59 Cal. 2d 128, 148, 378 P.2d 793, 806, 28 Cal. Rptr. 489, 502 ("[lilt appears
that in enacting the subject statute the Legislature intended to create a new program for the
confinement (which in truth is a quarantine rather than penal sanction), treatment, and reha-
bilitation of narcotics addicts."), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 856 (1963).
34. See, eg., People v. Moore, 69 Cal. 2d 674, 682, 446 P.2d 800, 805, 72 Cal. Rptr. 800,
805 (1968), overruled on other grounds by People v. Thomas, 19 Cal. 3d 630, 566 P.2d 228, 139
Cal. Rptr. 594 (1977); People ex rel Blunt v. Narcotic Addiction Control Comm'n, 295
N.Y.S.2d 276, 282 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 296 N.Y.S.2d 533 (App. Div. 1968), aff'd, 248 N.E.2d
918 (N.Y. 1969).
35. Watkins v. Roche, 529 F. Supp. 327, 332 (S.D. Ga. 1981).
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the purpose of DDC is "to prevent drug related crime" 36 and to halt the
"revolving door" of drug related crime.3 7  Under such an approach,
DDC is perceived as a means of deterring future criminal behavior.3 8 In
addition, courts have argued that some DDC provisions were enacted
with the intention of reaching only those individuals most likely to be
rehabilitated through treatment and that other institutional mechanisms,
including the criminal justice system, are more appropriate for other
drug dependent individuals. 39 In general, DDC is believed to have been
designed to accomplish a number of these goals,4' compounded by a
sense of urgency41 and necessitated by a failure or lack of alternative
responses. 42
C. Analytic Models
When analyzing the procedures used in the civil commitment of
drug dependent individuals, the courts have frequently used two models.
Under the first model, the criminal justice system is viewed as providing
the appropriate analogy. The rationale for using this approach is that an
36. In re Lopez, 181 Cal. App. 3d 836, 839, 226 Cal. Rptr. 710, 712 (1986); see also In re
Jiminez, 166 Cal. App. 3d 686, 692, 212 Cal. Rptr. 550, 554 (1985) (stating that rehabilitation
and treatment are particularly necessary for narcotic addicts guilty of committing crimes).
However, both courts also cited the therapeutic element of DDC by noting that unless the
offender is cured of his or her addiction, the chance of recidivism is substantial. Lopez, 181
Cal. App. 3d at 840, 226 Cal. Rptr. at 713; Jiminez, 166 Cal. App. 3d at 692, 212 Cal. Rptr. at
554.
37. In re Bye, 12 Cal. 3d 96, 104, 524 P.2d 854, 859, 115 Cal. Rptr. 382, 387 (1974), cert.
denied, 420 U.S. 996 (1975).
38. See Jiminez, 166 Cal. App. 3d at 692, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 555; see also In re Mabie, 159
Cal. App. 3d 301, 308, 205 Cal. Rptr. 528, 532 (1984) (stating that particularized treatment
provides most likely prospect for successful reentry into society). Much of the case law per-
taining to DDC occurs in a criminal context-for example, where it is considered as an alter-
native to prosecution. Indeed, there are indications that it occurs primarily in this context.
See Elizabeth A. Beane & James C. Beck, Court Based Civil Commitment of Alcoholics and
Substance Abusers, 19 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 359 (1991). Somewhat different
questions may arise in assessing DDC in this context, such as the constitutionality of admitting
certain evidence in the course of the proceedings. See, eg., Moore, 69 Cal. 2d 674, 446 P.2d
800, 72 Cal. Rptr. 800; People v. Benedict, 2 Cal. App. 3d 400, 82 Cal. Rptr. 759 (1969). In
civil and criminal cases, different factors may weigh more heavily in balancing competing in-
terests. For example, in criminal cases, greater weight is given to the protection of the commu-
nity. However, the issues and considerations raised generally appear similar in both types of
cases. Thus, except if the ruling court has indicated that cases should be distinguished, the
case law has not differentiated between civil and criminal cases.
39. Marshall v. Parker, 470 F.2d 34, 37 (9th Cir. 1972), aff'd, 414 U.S. 417 (1974).
40. See Moore, 69 Cal. 2d at 684-85, 446 P.2d at 807, 72 Cal. Rptr. at 807 (1968).
41. See Donahue v. Rhode Island Dep't of Mental Health, 632 F. Supp. 1456, 1480
(D.R.I. 1986).
42. See In re De La 0, 59 Cal. 2d 128, 148-49, 378 P.2d 793, 806, 28 Cal. Rptr. 489, 502,
cert denied, 374 U.S. 856 (1963).
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illegal activity, such as possession of a controlled substance, is often in-
volved and that the employment of a state's police power is necessary to
limit the proliferation of drug abuse. Courts have held that the liberty
interest at stake in DDC, as well as the potential stigma associated with
involuntary commitment,43 requires the imposition of standards and pro-
cedures adopted in criminal cases.'
Under the second model, the civil commitment of individuals with
mental illness (CMI) is considered to provide appropriate guidance. The
rationale for this model is that drug addiction induces behavior of which
the individual has little or no control, and the appropriate response of the
state, acting under its parens patriae 45 power, is to provide the individual
with treatment, not punishment.46 DDC is provided as an alternative to
criminal prosecution with the state attempting to help rather than punish
the individual.4 7 Judicial adherence to either of the two models is some-
times blurred because both models are typically incorporated in statutory
provisions establishing DDC.4 This has the potential to lead to incon-
sistent rulings, depending upon which model the judiciary views as pre-
dominant within a given context.49
D. Criteria for DDC
Many states currently have specific statutory provisions governing
DDC.5 0 Some states have provisions that collectively list a number of
43. It has been debated whether persons subjected to involuntary commitments are stig-
matized as a result of such commitment. Some courts have noted that modem, more progres-
sive commitment statutes are increasingly therapeutic and nonpunitive in nature, and as a
result do not attach as much stigma to the committed individual. Daniel Share, The Standard
of Proof in Involuntary Civil Commitment Proceedings, 1977 DET. C.L. REv. 209, 233.
44. Moore, 69 Cal. 2d 674, 446 P.2d 800, 72 Cal. Rptr. 800.
45. Parens patriae refers to the role of the state as the sovereign and guardian of persons
under legal disability, such as juveniles or the insane. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1114 (6th
ed. 1990).
46. See Donahue v. Rhode Island Dep't of Mental Health, 632 F. Supp. 1456, 1462
(D.R.I. 1986); People ex rel Blunt v. Narcotic Addiction Control Comm'n, 295 N.Y.S.2d 276,
282 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 296 N.Y.S.2d 533 (App. Div. 1968), aff'd, 248 N.E.2d 918 (N.Y. 1969).
47. Donahue, 632 F. Supp. at 1469.
48. See, eg., Narcotic Addict Rehabilitation Act of 1966, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3401-3441 (1988).
49. See supra notes 44, 46-48 and accompanying text; infra notes 77-85 and accompanying
text.
50. Garcia & Keilitz, supra note 21, at 419. These states include: Arkansas, ARK. CODE
ANN. § 20-64-815 (Michie 1991); California, CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 3050-3054, 3100-
3111 (West 1984 & Supp. 1992); Connecticut, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17a-627 (West
1988); Florida, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 397.052 (West 1986 & Supp. 1992); Georgia, GA. CODE
ANN. § 88-406.2 (Harrison 1986 & Supp. 1991); Hawaii, HAW. REv. STAT. §§ 334-60.2 to -86
(1985 & Supp. 1991); Iowa, IOWA CODE ANN. § 125.75 (West 1987 & Supp. 1992); Kansas,
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-5206 (1983 & Supp. 1991); Louisiana, LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 28:53
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conditions, including drug dependency, for which civil commitment can
be instituted.51 Other states have no specific provisions dealing with
DDC, although some do allow civil commitment for purposes of treating
mental illness (CMI). 2
Courts have addressed, in DDC proceedings, whether drug depen-
dency should be categorized as a form of mental illness for purposes of
civil commitment. As early as 1920, one court was faced with the issue
of whether a person adjudicated in one state to be sane could simultane-
ously be held in another state to be addicted to liquors and narcotics to
the point of depriving the person of "reasonable self control. '5 3 Histori-
cally, many of the initial attempts to establish DDC were modelled after
(West 1989); Massachusetts, MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 123, § 35 (West 1986 & Supp.
1992); Minnesota, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 253b.05 (West 1982 & Supp. 1992); Mississippi, Miss.
CODE ANN. §§ 41-30-27, 41-32-1 (1972 & Supp. 1992); Missouri, Mo. ANN. STAT. § 631.120
(Vernon 1988 & Supp. 1992); New Mexico, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 43-2-8 (Michie 1978); North
Carolina, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122C-281 (1989); North Dakota, N.D. CENT. CODE § 25-03.1-
07 (1989 & Supp. 1991); Oklahoma, OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43A, § 9-102 (West 1990); Rhode
Island, R.I. GEN. LAWS § 21-28.2-3 (1989); South Carolina, S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-52-70
(Law. Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 1991); South Dakota, S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 34-20A-70
(1986 & Supp. 1992); Texas, TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 462.061-.081 (West
1992); Washington, WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 70.96A.140 (West 1992); West Virginia, W.
VA. CODE § 27-5-2 (1986 & Supp. 1992); and Wisconsin, Wis. STAT. ANN. § 51.20 (West 1987
& Supp. 1991). The District of Columbia also has a statutory provision governing DDC. D.C.
CODE ANN. § 24-608 (1981).
51. Garcia & Keilitz, supra note 21, at 419. These states include: Indiana, IND. CODE
ANN. § 12-23-11.1 (Burms 1988 & Supp. 1992); Kentucky, Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 222.430
(Michie/Bobb-Merrill 1991); Maine, ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §§ 1353-1355 (West 1992);
Michigan, MICH. STAT. ANN. § 14.15(6501)-(6521) (Callaghan 1988); Nevada, NEV. REv.
STAT. ANN. §§ 458.290 -.350 (Michie 1991); Vermont, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 7611-8008,
8401-8405 (1987); and Virginia, VA. CODE ANN. §§ 37.1-67.1 to -70 (Michie 1990 & Supp.
1992).
52. Garcia & Keilitz, supra note 21, at 419. These states include: Alabama, ALA. CODE
§ 22-52-1.1 (1990 & Supp. 1991); Alaska, ALASKA STAT. §§ 47.30.700 -.815 (1990); Arizona,
ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 36-533 (1986 & Supp. 1991); Colorado, COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 27-
10-101 to -129 (1989 & Supp. 1991); Delaware, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, §§ 5001-5014 (1983
& Supp. 1990); Idaho, IDAHO CODE §§ 66-317 to -355 (1989 & Supp. 1992); Illinois, ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 91 1/2, paras. 3-600 to -909 (Smith-Hurd 1987); Maryland, MD. HEALTH-
GEN. CODE ANN. § 8-501 (1990 & Supp. 1992); Montana, MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 53-21-101
to -198 (1991); New Hampshire, N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 135-C:20 to -C:54 (1990 & Supp.
1991); and New Jersey, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 30:4-27.2 to -27.22 (Supp. 1991).
Four states expressly exclude drug dependence from their definitions of mental illness or
mental disorder. These states are: Alaska, ALASKA STAT. § 47.30.915(12) (1984); Arizona,
ARiZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-501(22)(a) (1986 & Supp. 1991); New Hampshire, N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 135-C:2(x) (1977 & Supp. 1990); and New York, N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW
§ 1.03(20) (McKinney 1988).
53. Interdiction of Gasquet, 85 So. 884 (La.), cert. denied, 254 U.S. 648 (1920).
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CMI,54 and current statutory schemes for DDC bear strong similarity to
those for CMI.
5 s
Recently, in determining whether general civil commitment provi-
sions encompass drug dependency, some courts have held that drug ad-
diction or intoxication, although potentially resulting in "dangerous
behavior," are not forms of mental illness.56 Thus, a drug dependent
person could not be committed for treatment as a mentally ill person if
statutory language authorizing civil commitment did not specifically re-
fer to drug dependency as a ground for civil commitment.
Other courts, however, have ruled that drug dependency and mental
illness are synonymous for purposes of applying the applicable civil com-
mitment law." For example, an Oregon court noted that "'[d]rug ad-
dicts can be civilly committed under the general commitment statutes,
with the same criteria for commitment as with other mental disor-
ders.' "'8 During that time, in Oregon, the statutory definition of a men-
tally ill person for purposes of civil commitment was "a person who,
because of a mental disorder, is either: (a) Dangerous to self or others; or
(b) Unable to provide for basic personal needs and is not receiving such
care as is necessary for health or safety."59
Generally, before an individual may be committed for the treatment
of drug dependency,' the court must find not only that the individual is
54. See Aronowitz, supra note 16, at 406.
55. See Garcia & Keilitz, supra note 21, at 419.
56. See, eg., In re Stokes, 546 A.2d 356 (D.C. 1988); In re Marquardt, 427 N.E.2d 411
(Ill. 1981); Dudley v. State ex reL Dudley, 730 S.W.2d 51 (Tex. 1987).
57. See, e.g., In re Evans, 408 N.E.2d 33, 36 (Ill. 1980); State v. Smith, 692 P.2d 120, 122-
24 (Or. Ct. App. 1984). This split in opinion has occurred even between courts within the
same state. Compare Marquardt, 427 N.E.2d at 414 (holding that state failed to sustain its
burden of proof that drug dependence is mental illness) with Evans, 408 N.E.2d at 34 (assum-
ing that defendant who mixed alcohol and phenobarbital was mentally ill).
58. Smith, 692 P.2d at 122 (citation omitted); accord Evans, 408 N.E.2d at 35 (holding
that mentally ill person who admittedly was prone to drinking large quantities of beer while
taking phenobarbital was properly subjected to involuntary commitment proceedings as men-
tally ill person). In Evans, the court noted that the evidence was sufficient to establish that the
individual was "'unable to provide for his basic physical needs so as to guard himself from
physical harm,"' id at 36 (quoting trial court), but that an allegation that the person was
"'reasonably expected to inflict serious physical harm upon himself or another'" may have
been more appropriate, id at 35 (quoting ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 91 1/2, para. 1-119 (1987)).
Although not necessarily equated with mental illness, drug dependency also has been
classified as an illness, serving as a basis for distinguishing DDC from criminal prosecution
and punishment. See In re Lopez, 181 Cal. App. 3d 836, 839, 226 Cal. Rptr. 710, 712 (1986).
59. OR. REv. STAT. § 426.005(2) (1987). A 1989 amendment added a third criterion,
incorporating individuals who are chronically mentally ill. Id. § 426.005(2)(c) (Supp. 1992).
60. The cases included in this Article have utilized various terms to refer to drug depen-
dency, including "substance abuse," "narcotics," "narcotic," "drug addiction," "drug depen-
dence" and "chemical dependency." Some of these terms include alcoholism, and cases
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drug dependent, but also that the individual is dangerous to him or her-
self or to others, or lacks the capacity to care for him or herself.6 The
specific criteria for civil commitment vary considerably from state to
state.62 For example, in Minnesota the individual must be "incapable of
self-management" or pose "a substantial likelihood of physical harm to
self or others."' 63  Other states have adopted requirements such as: a
"reasonable expectation... of harm to [self], others, or property"; 64 a
substantial injury to health or interference with functioning; 65 or, "lost
...power of self-control with respect to the use of. . .controlled
substances.
66
Further, some states require that proper treatment facilities be avail-
able and that it be likely the respondent will benefit from treatment
before they will commit an individual for drug dependency.67 Arguably,
where these bases for commitment are included, the criteria for DDC are
narrower than those imposed for civil commitment in general, which
may not require a showing that treatment is available or likely to benefit
the individual. 68 Conversely, several courts have ruled that it is not nec-
essary to show that the individual will benefit from treatment, or that the
treatment is likely to be effective, before instituting DDC.
69
Some commentators assert that the criteria for DDC in some states
may be broader than that for CMI because a showing of a need for treat-
ment will substitute for a showing of "dangerousness. ' 70 Alternatively,
the California DDC statute requires only a showing of narcotic addiction
or imminent danger of addiction, and a need for care, supervision and
dealing with the commitment of alcoholics have been included to the extent that those cases
may be applicable to DDC. Civil commitment for the use of cocaine also has been included,
although cocaine may not technically be addictive. See Craig Van Dyke & Robert Byck, Co-
caine, ScI. AM., Mar. 1982, at 128, 140. However, cocaine would seem to be addictive under
the more common definition of addiction, and courts have generally held that dependence on
cocaine is a sufficient basis for DDC. See, eg., People v. Victor, 62 Cal. 2d 280, 304 n.17, 398
P.2d 391, 406 n.17, 42 Cal. Rptr. 199, 214 n.17 (1965); People v. Beasley, 145 Cal. App. 3d 16,
19, 193 Cal. Rptr. 86, 86 (1983).
61. See Garcia & Keilitz, supra note 21, at 419-20. To the extent that these criteria are
imposed, they parallel the requirements that must be met by states prior to the initiation of
civil commitment in general. See O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 575 (1975).
62. See generally Garcia & Keilitz, supra note 21, at 426-37 (summarizing, classifying and
comparing state statutes governing involuntary civil commitment of drug dependent adults).
63. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 253B.02(2) (West Supp. 1992).
64. N.D. CENT. CODE § 25-03.1-02 (1989 & Supp. 1991).
65. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 123, § 35 (West 1986 & Supp. 1992).
66. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 397.052(1)(a) (West 1986 & Supp. 1992).
67. Garcia & Keilitz, supra note 21, at 420.
68. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 574 n.10 (1975).
69. See infra notes 399-419 and accompanying text.
70. Garcia & Keilitz, supra note 21, at 420.
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treatment.7 1 These criteria, as applied by the California courts, do not
explicitly include dangerousness per se, except to the extent that they
assume that narcotic addiction is inherently dangerous to oneself or
others. 2 The federal DDC statute also makes only tangential reference
to a dangerousness element.7" In reviewing the legality of the federal
statute, however, one court examined the statute's legislative history,
which referred to drug addiction as a "communicable disease," and
found civil commitment to be a proper exercise of Congress's power to
protect public health and welfare, thereby suggesting that addiction im-
posed an implicit danger to the individual or others.74
Finally, a Rhode Island statute that allowed DDC if it could be
shown that the individual was "incapacitated by alcohol" was upheld
after the court inferred additional criteria that would establish that the
person is "highly likely to be at significant personal risk.., or to pose a
realistic threat to other persons."175 Thus, it had to be shown that there
was more than a mere need for treatment: that the person demonstrate
71. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 3102.5, 3106.5 (West 1984).
72. See, eg., People v. Victor, 62 Cal. 2d 280, 305, 398 P.2d 391, 407, 42 Cal. Rptr. 199,
215 (1965). For cases discussing the California criteria and their application, see People v.
Thomas, 19 Cal. 3d 631, 635, 566 P.2d 228, 230, 139 Cal. Rptr. 594, 596 (1977) (stating that
presence of "tracks" without corroborating evidence of heroin use is insufficient to support
finding that person is currently heroin addict); People v. Moore, 69 Cal. 2d 674, 446 P.2d 800,
72 Cal. Rptr. 800 (1968) (stating that no act of possession or use need be shown in establishing
addiction), overruled on other grounds by People v. Thomas, 19 Cal. 3d 631, 566 P.2d 228, 139
Cal. Rptr. 594 (1977); Victor, 62 Cal. 2d at 298-305, 398 P.2d at 402-06, 42 Cal. Rptr. at 210-
15 (1965) (holding that emotional dependence, tolerance and physical dependence must be
established and that imminent danger of addiction standard is not impermissibly vague); In re
De La O, 59 Cal. 2d 128, 152, 378 P.2d 793, 809, 28 Cal. Rptr. 489, 505 (holding that "addict"
and "imminent danger of becoming addicted" are not impermissibly vague), cert. denied, 374
U.S. 856 (1963); People v. Valdez, 260 Cal. App. 2d 895, 67 Cal. Rptr. 583 (1968) (finding
evidence sufficient to meet elements of narcotic addiction); People v. Duncan, 255 Cal. App.
2d 75, 62 Cal. Rptr. 822 (1967) (finding evidence sufficient to meet elements of narcotic
addiction).
73. See 42 U.S.C. § 3411(a) (1988).
74. Ortega v. Rasor, 291 F. Supp. 748 (S.D. Fla. 1968).
75. Donahue v. Rhode Island Dep't of Mental Health, 632 F. Supp. 1456, 1477 (D.R.I.
1986). The court added:
This court concludes that R.I. Gen. Laws § 40.1-4-11, read reasonably and in the
context of the RIAITA [Rhode Island Alcoholism and Intoxication Treatment Act]
as a whole, makes it sufficiently clear that the sweep of the statutory phrase "incapac-
itated by alcohol" was intended to be self-limiting to situations where a putative
detainee has posed a relatively immediate threat to himself or to others, that is, that
the statute implicitly requires, as a condition precedent to emergency commitment,
that the subject's potential for harming himself or others be critical enough to justify
the "massive curtailment of liberty,".., which such confinement entails .... [Tihe
criterion is one of dangerousness.
Id. at 1480 (citation omitted).
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a condition "transcending substantial impairment" accompanied by a
"considerable need for treatment. '76
These criteria are not always explicitly established by statute, and
the courts have had to construe and define these terms to set up a consis-
tent and workable scheme for DDC. For example, in Minnesota, the
criteria "incapable of [self-management]" was interpreted by one court to
mean that a person "cannot adequately function," as applied to an indi-
vidual who could not control his drinking and subsequent aggressive be-
havior, and who had to rely on family members to help pay his bills."
Another Minnesota court, after reviewing this case, stated that "incapa-
ble of self-management" included not just the inability to pay one's bills
but inability to perform "the ordinary activities of daily life."78
The dangerousness to self or others criteria has been demonstrated
through harm or attempted harm to oneself or others,79 through the
inability to care for oneself,80 or through failing to take care of an imme-
diate and dangerous medical problem that is the result of drug depen-
dency.81 A mere assertion of dangerousness, however, without
substantiating evidence, has been considered an insufficient basis for in-
stituting DDC.82 One court not only recognized that dangerousness
must be established, but required that the individual "transcend[ ] sub-
stantial impairment" and have a "considerable need for treatment." 3 In
reviewing Rhode Island's commitment scheme for alcoholics, this court
found that the commitment criteria provided a two-prong test that not
76. Id The court noted that with these additions, "the 'incapacitated by alcohol' standard
... goes far beyond those impermissibly vague statutes which authorized the detention of the
mentally ill simply because it appeared (to someone) 'necessary and essential to do so,'... or
where there was nothing more than a 'need for observation and treatment.'" Id. at 1479
(citation omitted).
77. In re Galusha, 372 N.W.2d 843, 847 (Minn. 1985). But see In re J.S., 404 N.W.2d 79
(Wis. Ct. App. 1987) (DDC proceeding in which court refused to commit woman who had
failed to properly care for children because there had not been finding of dangerousness) (cit-
ing O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975) (holding that pursuant to general commit-
ment proceeding person who can survive in freedom with help of willing, responsible family
members or friends should not be committed)).
78. In re Heurung, 446 N.W.2d 694, 696 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989).
79. See, e.g., Donahue, 632 F. Supp. at 1477; Dick v. Watonwan County, 551 F. Supp.
983, 994 (D. Minn. 1982), remittitur ordered, 562 F. Supp. 1083 (D. Minn. 1983), rev'd in part,
738 F.2d 939 (8th Cir. 1984); Suzuki v. Quisenberry, 411 F. Supp. 1113, 1124-25 (D. Haw.
1976), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 617 F.2d 173 (9th Cir. 1980); People v. Garcia, 268 Cal.
App. 2d 712, 716 n.6, 74 Cal. Rptr. 103, 106 n.6 (1969); Galusha, 372 N.W.2d at 847; JS., 404
N.W.2d at 83; In re Guardianship of Shaw, 275 N.W.2d 143, 149 (Wis. Ct. App. 1979).
80. In re Evans, 408 N.E.2d 33, 35-36 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980).
81. Galusha, 372 N.W.2d at 847.
82. See Dick, 551 F. Supp. at 994.
83. Donahue, 632 F. Supp. at 1477.
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only encompassed "the notion of 'dangerousness' but also surpassed that
plateau." 4 The court stated that this criteria provided "clearer, better-
defined guidance to those charged with statutory enforcement than the
stock formulation of 'dangerous to himself or to others.' "85
Overall, courts have relied on CMI as the appropriate model in de-
termining what criteria should be applied prior to imposing DDC. How-
ever, perhaps because of the relatively infrequent use of DDC 6 or the
limited number of court challenges to its use, several aspects of the dan-
gerousness requirement potentially associated with DDC have not been
widely litigated, although they have been addressed in cases involving
CMI. They include a requirement of a recent showing of dangerousness
and a requirement that there be a showing of an overt act demonstrating
dangerousness.8 7 If incorporated, an overt or recent act requirement
would likely mandate a showing of a specific instance in which the
individual for whom DDC is proposed had possessed or used a drug, or a
showing of specific evidence of drug abuse-for example, "track" marks
on an individual's arm from the repeated insertion of hypodermic need-
les. In one of the few DDC cases addressing these issues, the reviewing
court apparently viewed such requirements as moving too far afield from
a treatment model toward a criminal model, and rejected their
incorporation. 8
III. INITATION OF DDC
A. Emergency Detention
The various statutory schemes for DDC invariably include provi-
sions permitting the emergency detention of drug dependent persons
without a judicial hearing. 9 The purpose of such emergency detentions
84. Id
85. Id.
86. See Keilitz et al., supra note 20, at 5.
87. See generally Samuel J. Brakel, Involuntary Institutionalization, in SAMUEL J. BRAKEL
ET AL., THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 21, 36 (3d ed. 1985) (citing range of
relevant judicial opinions, and stating that issue of whether overt act is required to demon-
strate dangerousness is "generally unsettled and complex"); I MICHAEL L. PERLIN, MENTAL
DISABILITY LAW: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL § 2.13, at 110-15 (1989 & Supp. 1991) (discussing
requirement of overt act of dangerousness).
88. See People v. Moore, 69 Cal. 2d 674, 684-85, 446 P.2d 800, 807, 72 Cal. Rptr. 800, 807
(1968), overruled on other grounds by People v. Thomas, 19 Cal. 3d 630, 566 P.2d 228, 139 Cal.
Rptr. 594 (1977).
89. See Garcia & Keilitz, supra note 21, at 421. Although similar, detention without a
hearing for emergency purposes is sometimes distinguished from temporary observation or
confinement. The latter has often been utilized in conjunction with civil commitment in gen-
eral. See Brakel, supra note 87, at 54. It appears, however, that lately this procedure is not
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is to provide immediate protection for, and control of, an individual who
might harm him or herself while under the influence of drugs, as well as
to protect other members of society from the individual.90 There are two
routes by which emergency detention is generally initiated. Under the
first approach, a police officer or other designated official may detain an
individual if there is reason to believe that the person satisfies the statu-
tory criteria for emergency detention. 91 Under the second approach, a
petitioner may request the court to issue an order to take the individual
into custody. 92 The petition must contain statutorily required informa-
tion that establishes the basis for the petitioner's belief that the individual
meets the DDC criteria. Under either route, the detained individual
must be examined within a specified length of time, and if the criteria for
detention are not met, the detainee must be released. 93 Most DDC stat-
utes provide that detention can only last for twenty-four to seventy-two
hours, after which the individual must be released, unless a petition for
judicial commitment is filed, generally by staff at the facility where the
individual is detained.94
There are few judicial opinions discussing the use of emergency de-
tention as part of DDC. In one opinion, a federal district court judge
reviewed Hawaii's emergency detention procedures under statutory com-
mitment provisions entitled "Mental Health, Mental Illness, Drug Ad-
diction and Alcoholism."95 The same emergency detention provision
applied to all conditions identified in the title of the statute.96
The court ruled that "[s]omething more than mental illness or sub-
stance abuse is required to trigger the use of [this provision]. 97 In re-
used as frequently, as alternatives, such as emergency detention, provide the ability to take a
person into custody and to make observations pending a hearing on the need for hospitaliza-
tion. There is apparently no case law discussing the use of temporary observation in connec-
tion with DDC, perhaps because emergency detention has been used in its place.
90. See, eg., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 3000 (West 1984).
91. See, eg., id § 3100.6; HAw. REV. STAT. § 334-59(1) (Supp. 1991).
92. See, eg., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 253B.05 (West 1982 & Supp. 1992); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS ANN. § 34-20A-64 (1986); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 51.15(4)-(5) (West 1987 & Supp. 1989).
93. Garcia & Keilitz, supra note 21, at 421.
94. See, eg., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 253B.05(3) (West 1982 & Supp. 1992); Garcia & Kei-
litz, supra note 21, at 421.
95. Suzuki v. Quisenberry, 411 F. Supp. 1113, 1125-27 (D. Haw. 1976). In a very short
opinion involving a challenge to an individual's admission to a private chemical dependency
unit, the Fifth Circuit also upheld a state statute authorizing emergency involuntary admis-
sions with a judicial hearing held within five days of admission. Jarrell v. Chemical Depen-
dency Unit, 791 F.2d 373, 375 (5th Cir. 1986).
96. Act of June 7, 1967, 1967 Haw. Sess. Laws 385 (repealed 1976).
97. Suzuki, 411 F. Supp. at 1125.
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viewing the statutory language, the court concluded that the purpose of
the provision was
to provide an alternative to the arrest and jailing of a person
who is behaving in a manner that might be deemed to be in
violation of a criminal law, or that might endanger that per-
son's safety, where the arresting officer believes that mental ill-
ness or intoxication might be a cause of the behavior.98
After discussing a series of cases addressing the emergency detention of
mentally ill persons, the court found that Hawaii's provision did not vio-
late the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and that the
state's interest in emergency intervention was "sufficient to justify the
temporary deprivation of liberty without prior notice or hearing."9 9 Fur-
thermore, the court ruled that a full hearing is not the necessary result of
an emergency detention. Instead, "the patient may be released without
further action, or may agree to be a voluntary patient for a longer period
of time, or may be turned over to the police for processing in the criminal
justice system."" °
In Donahue v. Rhode Island Department of Mental Health,10 1 an-
other opinion upholding the use of emergency detention in conjunction
with DDC, a federal district court recognized the potential infringement
on the individual's liberty interest and held that due process must be
afforded in conjunction with this detention."0 2 Nevertheless, the court
ruled that a hearing did not need to take place before an individual is
confined, noting that emergency detention constitutes an "extraordinary
situation" justifying the postponement of the hearing. 10 As its rationale,
the court stated: "A strong comparison can be drawn to the annals of
psychiatric affliction: where the state has involuntarily committed a
mentally ill person on an emergency basis, courts have been unanimous
in holding that a deprivation hearing was not required.""3 4
The court also noted that the judiciary in CMI cases has been un-
able to forge a consensus on the length of time an individual can be de-
tained without a hearing, with courts holding that an individual may be
detained anywhere from two to forty-five days."°s Noting that "no spe-
98. Id.
99. Id. at 1126.
100. I11
101. 632 F. Supp. 1456 (D.R.I. 1986).
102. I at 1461-62.
103. Id at 1463.
104. Id (citations omitted).
105. Id.
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cific time limit can automatically be accorded talismanic effect,"' 1 6 the
court stated that there must be an opportunity to be heard "at a mean-
ingful time and in a meaningful manner."' 7 It then balanced the liberty
interests of the individual 1 8 against the state's interest in preventing indi-
viduals from harming themselves or others," and concluded that the
statute allowing the state to hold an individual for up to ten days without
a hearing met constitutional due process requirements.110 The court
listed a number of reasons for its ruling: (1) An individual may not be
taken into custody merely for safekeeping, but must be provided immedi-
ate treatment, thereby minimizing the violation of the individual's liberty
interest; (2) state officials need to be afforded flexibility in detaining dan-
gerous individuals in exigent circumstances; (3) testing and observation
during initial detention allows for a better-informed hearing on the neces-
sity of confinement; (4) procedural protections' minimize the likelihood
of an erroneous confinement; and (5) the individual may not be suffi-
ciently detoxified initially to participate meaningfully in a hearing.' 12
The court stated that the most important reason for its ruling was that
the requirement of an immediate hearing would damage the state's abil-
ity to treat and care for the individual, thereby undermining the rationale
for decriminalizing this area." 3 The court also noted that its decision
was made particularly difficult by the lack of understanding of drug de-
pendency in general, which contributed to its willingness to provide the
state latitude in formulating its procedures for addressing this matter.' 14
The court concluded, however, that the ten-day period "falls toward the
outermost periphery of what is permissible.""' 5
106. Id at 1464.
107. Id.
108. Id
109. Id at 1465.
110. Id at 1471.
111. The procedural protections included: requiring the petition to be accompanied by a
physician's certificate; requiring hospital staff to discharge the individual if there were no
grounds for commitment; and providing the individual with notice and access to counsel
within 24 hours after commitment. Id at 1466-67.
112. d at 1464-65.
113. d at 1468. The court stated that
such a procedure might well defeat, or at least seriously wound, the state's goal of
caring for dangerously intoxicated individuals. If the state's resources are devoted to
preparation and conduct of mandatory probable cause hearings, and are, concomi-
tantly, siphoned away from treatment and care, then decriminalization and the "con-
tinuum of treatment" that the RIAITA [Rhode Island Alcoholism and Intoxication
Treatment Act] seeks to achieve will be subverted.
Id (citation omitted).
114. Id at 1466, 1469.
115. Id. at 1471.
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B. Medical Certification
Statutes regulating DDC typically provide for a medical examina-
tion116 of the allegedly drug dependent person.117 In addition, statutory
provisions for emergency detention of drug dependent persons often
mandate a medical examination," 8 although this requirement may be
waived under exigent circumstances.119 In reviewing these provisions,
courts have ruled that the medical examination must be held within a
specified time after admission to a treatment facility in order to protect
the due process rights of the individual.12°
Some DDC statutes provide that a petition for the long-term com-
mitment of a drug dependent person must be supported by the written
statement of a physician who recently has conducted an examination of
the subject.1 2 1 The statutes often require that a copy of a "pre-hearing
screening" report be served upon the individual for whom DDC is pro-
posed, along with a court order for a medical examination.1 22 An indi-
vidual's refusal to be examined by a doctor generally will not block the
proceedings. However, the court may order the individual to submit to
an examination.1 23 Alternatively, courts have held that a doctor's opin-
ion based solely upon a review of the individual's medical records is suffi-
116. Some states allow these examinations to be conducted by professionals other than phy-
sicians, such as properly certified psychologists. See, eg., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-5203 (1985
& Supp. 1989); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 123, § 35 (West Supp. 1991).
117. See, eg., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-379 (West 1988 & Supp. 1990).
118. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 37-7-41 (Harrison 1990); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-5203
(1985 & Supp. 1989); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 253B.06 (West 1982 & Supp. 1992). States also
have recently enacted provisions enabling probation officers to test arrestees for drug abuse at
the pretrial release decision stage or as a condition of release. See JOHN A. CARVER, DRUGS
AND CRIME: CONTROLLING USE AND REDUCING RISK THROUGH TESTING, NATIONAL IN-
STITUTE OF JUSTICE: RESEARCH IN ACTION (1986); see also State v. Guzman, 467 N.W.2d
564 (Ct. App. 1991) (upholding order of sentencing judge that required convicted drug dealer
to undergo drug test as condition for probation), aff'd, 480 N.W.2d 446 (Wis.), cert denied,
112 S. Ct. 2952 (1992).
119. See Dick v. Watonwan County, 551 F. Supp. 983 (D. Minn. 1982).
120. See Watkins v. Roche, 529 F. Supp. 327 (S.D. Ga. 1981) (stating that examination
must occur within 24 hours); In re Redcloud, 359 N.W.2d 710 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984) (stating
that examination must occur within 48 hours of admission).
121. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 253B.06 (West 1982 & Supp. 1992). If the petitioner is not
able to get an examiner's statement, he or she can set forth the reasons why, and the court will
consider this in the preliminary hearing to determine whether to order an examination and
whether detention before commitment is required. Id. § 253B.07(1).
122. See, eg., id. § 253B.07(4); People ex rel Berdaguer v. Morrow, 302 N.Y.S.2d 628, 633
(Sup. Ct. 1969). In addition, the DDC candidate and his or her attorney should be given a
reasonable time to inspect and evaluate the medical report. See id.
123. See Watkins, 529 F. Supp. 327.
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cient if a personal examination was not conducted because the individual
refused to cooperate.
1 24
Although a physician's opinion is generally acceptable and pre-
sumed valid,1 21 it has been held that if a medical opinion or certificate is
challenged by either the petitioning party or the respondent, the certify-
ing opinion must be supported by "sufficient evidence" in the record to
justify an order of commitment or an order of release.1 26 In addition,
one DDC was rescinded when the trial court record failed to show that
statutory requirements concerning the medical certification had been
met.127 The record showed that the examining physicians did not attend
the hearing and did not certify that the candidate for DDC met commit-
ment criteria. 128 However, it appears that ordinarily a physician's opin-
ion is given great weight. 129
Civil commitment statutes often require that one or two physicians
examine the patient.1 30 A requirement that a medical certification ac-
company the initial petition for commitment also has been widely insti-
tuted to screen out frivolous or malicious petitions.13 1 Statutes often
provide for a subsequent medical opinion to protect the individual for
whom commitment is proposed from an erroneous conclusion that might
otherwise result if only one doctor conducted an examination. 132 Similar
provisions are found with regard to DDC.133 Some state statutes author-
ize an additional independent medical opinion in DDC proceedings. 134
Initially, a California appellate court found that an alleged addict,
facing criminal charges, only had the right to a second physician's opin-
ion if the first examining physician determined the patient to be an addict
124. See In re Rice, 410 N.W.2d 907 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987).
125. Judges are likely to rely heavily on psychiatric testimony at CMI proceedings. See,
e.g., COMMISSION ON THE MENTALLY DISABLED, AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, INVOLUNTARY
CIVIL COMMITMENT: A MANUAL FOR LAWYERS AND JUDGES 22 (1988). Although it is
likely that this applies equally to DDC, research on the matter has not yet been conducted.
126. See People v. Carley, 276 Cal. App. 2d 820, 81 Cal. Rptr. 414 (1969).
127. Id. at 824, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 417.
128. In re Jones, 61 Cal. 2d 325, 392 P.2d 269, 38 Cal. Rptr. 509 (1964), cert. denied, 379
U.s. 980 (1965).
129. See In re James, 283 N.Y.S.2d 126, 148 (Sup. Ct.), rev'd sub nom. In re Narcotic
Addiction Control Comm'n, 285 N.Y.S.2d 793 (App. Div. 1967), rev'd sub nom. Narcotic
Addiction Control Comm'n v. James, 240 N.E.2d 29 (N.Y. 1968).
130. See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 3103.5 (West 1984); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch.
123, § 5 (Law. Co-op. 1992).
131. Brakel, supra note 87, at 59.
132. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-1-1107 (1991); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 17a-502 (1990);
OKLA. STAT. tit. 43A, § 9-102 (1991).
133. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 3102 (West 1984).
134. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28:54.D(2) (West 1977 & Supp. 1989).
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in need of treatment. 135 The court may have felt that a criminal defend-
ant only had an interest in not being involuntarily committed and that
there could be no interest in receiving treatment, particularly as an alter-
native to incarceration. This is in line with earlier decisions holding that
there was no fundamental right to receive treatment for drug addiction at
public expense.
1 36
Four years later, however, another California appellate court found
that a person can have an interest in being committed for treatment.
131
The court held that a criminal defendant has the right to a second doc-
tor's opinion even if the first doctor concludes that the defendant is not
an addict. 131 This development may indicate a change in the way that
society, and the courts, perceive drug addiction and its treatment. The
transition from holding that a person only has an interest in not receiving
treatment to the contemporary holding that a person may have an inter-
est in receiving treatment, 39 particularly as an alternative to criminal
incarceration, may reflect greater optimism that treatment can have a
beneficial effect and that mere custody without treatment is unlikely to
redress the individual's problems.
In the DDC context, however, courts have held that the opinion of
one doctor may be enough to warrant an order of commitment."4 For
135. See Salcido v. Superior Court, 112 Cal. App. 3d 994, 1001, 169 Cal. Rptr. 597, 600
(1980).
136. See, e.g., Marshall v. Parker, 470 F.2d 34, 38 (9th Cir. 1972), aff'd, 414 U.S. 417
(1974).
137. People v. Davis, 160 Cal. App. 3d 970, 982, 207 Cal. Rptr. 18, 27 (1984).
138. Id. The court was dealing with a criminal defendant who was seeking treatment in
lieu of prosecution, rather than a purely civil commitment proceeding. The court, in analyzing
the Salcido decision, 112 Cal. App. 3d 994, 169 Cal. Rptr. 597, did not reject outright the
holding that a person facing an order of involuntary commitment only has an interest in free-
dom. However, it stated that a defendant who requests the opinion of a second doctor, after
the first has concluded that treatment is not necessary, has a protected interest in that treat-
ment. Davis, 160 Cal. App. 3d at 980, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 25. The situation in which a defend-
ant seeks treatment, however, may be distinguishable from a DDC proceeding where there is
an attempt to impose treatment against the individual's wishes. But see People v. Victor, 62
Cal. 2d 280, 398 P.2d 391, 42 Cal. Rptr. 199 (1965).
139. The development of the rights of persons committed for treatment of drug abuse may
be a direct result of litigation of the same issue for mentally ill patients. A pioneer case estab-
lishing the right of mentally ill patients to receive adequate treatment and care was Wyatt v.
Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373, 377 (M.D. Ala. 1972), aff'd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. Wyatt
v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974), in which the Fifth Circuit held that the State of
Alabama was to ensure that persons committed for treatment receive proper care and have
their rights safeguarded, and that "a failure by defendants to comply with this decree cannot
be justified by a lack of operating funds." Id.
140. See, e.g., People v. Candelaria, 18 Cal. App. 3d 754, 96 Cal. Rptr. 90 (1971); L.R.C. v.
Klein, 383 A.2d 764, 768-69 (Super. Ct. Law Div. 1978), aff'd, 400 A.2d 496 (Super. Ct. App.
Div.), cert. denied, 405 A.2d 823 (N.J. 1979).
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example, if two doctors are assigned to examine an individual, and one
doctor determines that the patient is an addict and the other doctor can-
not come to a conclusion, commitment can be ordered-at least when
two additional physicians subsequently certify the patient as an addict. 141
Similarly, another court has ruled that if DDC is initiated by a peace or
health officer, who has reason to believe the person is addicted or in im-
minent danger of addiction and takes the person to a designated medical
institution, a single physician may conduct the examination. 42 Addi-
tionally, yet another court has held that no medical or psychiatric testi-
mony need be provided in conjunction with a commitment for
alcoholism, even though the state constitution requires medical or psy-
chiatric testimony for the commitment of a "person of unsound
mind.""14 The court reasoned that the phrase did not include an alco-
holic, and alcoholism should be distinguished from mental illness."4
C. Notice
It has been widely acknowledged that a mentally ill individual for
whom civil commitment is proposed is entitled to advance notice of the
time and place of the commitment hearing, as well as notice of the nature
of the proceedings.1 4 1 Similarly, courts have held that if such notice is
141. See People v. Bruce, 64 Cal. 2d 55, 60, 409 P.2d 943, 946, 48 Cal. Rptr. 719, 722
(1966).
142. See Candelaria, 18 Cal. App. 3d at 758-59, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 93-94. In distinguishing
this procedural route from the general DDC procedure, which required an examination by two
physicians but could be initiated by anyone, the court emphasized the additional protections
that this route provided the individual:
It will be noted that a section 3100 proceeding may commence upon the request of
anyone, and the examination by the appointed physicians follows. The alleged addict
is not necessarily in a medical facility when all of this is done. Proceedings under
section 3100.6 are initiated only by an officer, who has a public responsibility, and
who presumably has some training and experience to guide him, who brings the sub-
ject to the medical institution, where the superintendent, another responsible official,
receives him. The examination by the single physician is conducted in this setting.
Id. at 758, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 93. The court also remarked that the person was not precluded
from receiving an examination by another physician, that the person could introduce other
evidence on the issue, or if it found good reason, the court could appoint another physician.
Id. at 759, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 94.
143. Dudley v. State ex rel. Dudley, 730 S.W.2d 51, 53-54 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987).
144. Id.
145. See, eg., Doremus v. Farrell, 407 F. Supp. 509, 515 (N.D. Neb. 1975); 1 PERLIN,
supra note 87, § 3.19, at 236-38; NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, GUIDELINES FOR
INVOLUNTARY CIVIL CoMMrrMENT 58-59 (1986). Some argue that notice of a pending com-
mitment proceeding should not be given to a mentally ill individual because it may exacerbate
that person's symptoms. See Brakel, supra note 87, at 64. However, one commentator has
noted that "the experience of receiving notice would prove no more traumatic for the patient
than the experience of suddenly finding himself detained in a mental institution." Id. Addi-
tionally, this commentator noted:
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not provided to the respondent in a DDC proceeding, the commitment
order may be subject to collateral attack and set aside. 6 Compliance
with notice requirements has been deemed necessary to minimize the
confusion that an individual subjected to these proceedings may experi-
ence.14 Additionally, a lack of notice has been found "contrary to our
most fundamental notions of fairness and constitutes a deprivation of lib-
erty without due process of law." '148 There is some indication, however,
that the courts will consider the spirit of the notice requirement, and not
void a commitment because of a mere technical error in providing the
requisite notice if the individual has been duly given the necessary infor-
mation.149 In addition, the courts have not established how far in ad-
vance of the DDC hearing this notice must be given, what information
should be included with the notice, and at what stage of the proceedings
the information must be provided. Generally, these issues have been left
to the determination of the various state legislatures, which initially cre-
ated the relevant DDC proceedings. 5 °
The contention that notice is ineffective or harmful has also been challenged as
prejudging the individual's mental condition before the hearing. In addition, some
commentators have asserted... that notice and the opportunity to be heard are
constitutional requirements .... In the state legislatures, the arguments favoring full
notice to the proposed patient have carried the day.
Id. Further substantiating the appropriateness of providing notice to an individual subject to a
DDC proceeding, it can be argued that a drug dependent person does not suffer from the same
degree of psychological fragility as a mentally ill individual.
146. See In re Jones, 61 Cal. 2d 325, 328, 392 P.2d 269, 271, 38 Cal. Rptr. 509, 511 (1964),
cert. denied, 379 U.S. 980 (1965); In re Raner, 59 Cal. 2d 635, 642, 381 P.2d 638, 642-43, 30
Cal. Rptr. 814, 818-19 (1963); Exparte Liggett, 187 Cal. 428, 431, 202 P. 660, 661 (1921); In
re Singh, 234 Cal. App. 2d 455, 457-58, 44 Cal. Rptr. 474, 476 (1965); Narcotic Addiction
Control Comm'n v. James, 240 N.E.2d 29, 33 (N.Y. 1968); see also People ex reL Berdaguer v.
Morrow, 302 N.Y.S.2d 628, 633 (Sup. Ct. 1969) ("The petition, medical report, order of certi-
fication and transcripts of all proceedings leading to certification should accompany the nar-
cotic addict at all times.").
147. See Raner, 59 Cal. 2d at 642, 381 P.2d at 642, 30 Cal. Rptr. at 818.
148. James, 240 N.E.2d at 33.
149. See, eg., Dudley v. State ex reL Dudley, 730 S.W.2d 51 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987). After
noting that a complaint concerning the commitment proceeding not brought to the attention of
the trial court is considered waived, the court nevertheless reviewed appellant's due process
challenge because the notice he received was based on a repealed statute. Id at 54-55. The
probate court had provided him with a form titled "Notice of Hearing," which had not been
updated, and cited the outdated statute as the basis for the proceeding. Id at 55. The court
held that in order to satisfy due process, the appellant had to be made aware of the allegations
and afforded an opportunity to be heard. Id The reference to the repealed statute was consid-
ered superfluous, as appellant clearly received notice of the allegations and of his right to be
heard at the hearing. Id In addition, the essential elements of the repealed statute and the
current statute were found to be the same. Id
150. The minimum amount of time necessary to give an individual subject to DDC pro-
ceedings proper notice varies from state to state and depends on which aspect of the proceed-
ing is involved. If an emergency detention has been instituted, advance notice typically is not
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D. Screening Mechanisms
In an attempt to restructure the involuntary civil commitment of
mentally ill individuals, states have recently developed the use of early
screening mechanisms.15 1 Some states have statutorily authorized
screening agencies to provide an immediate evaluation of the assertions
regarding the individual, as well as his or her psychiatric history, i" 2 while
other states follow a more informal process of screening petitions for
commitment.- 53 These screening agencies attempt to: (1) immediately
direct an individual into the proper channel of treatment, thereby expe-
diting a response to the individual's treatment needs;15 4 (2) encourage the
exploration of alternatives to coercive involuntary treatment;15 5 or (3)
immediately release the individual if it is decided that treatment is not
necessary or appropriate, thereby protecting the individual's liberty inter-
required. Rather, notice must be given at or shortly after the time the individual is taken into
custody. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 125.77 (West 1985 & Supp. 1992); LA. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 28:53.1 (West 1989); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 631.130 (Vernon 1988); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 43-2-8.F (Michie 1989).
Some states include a medical examination as a prerequisite to the initiation of a DDC
proceeding and require prior notice of that exam. See, eg., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 3103
(West 1984) (requiring that notice be given at least one day before time of examination as fixed
by court order); Miss. CODE ANN. § 41-30-27(1) (Supp. 1991) (requiring that notice of hearing
be given "as soon as practicable after the examination by the certifying physicians"). Other
states require a preliminary hearing and provide for notice in advance of that hearing. See,
e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 253B.07(7)(b) (West Supp. 1992) (requiring at least 24 hours notice
of preliminary hearing). If a judicial commitment hearing is involved, the statutes tend to vary
from not establishing a minimum amount of time for advance notice to a matter of days,
although never more than a week. See, eg., D.C. CODE ANN. § 21-545(a) (1989) (requiring
that court set hearing date within five days after serving respondent with petition in open
court); GA. CODE ANN. § 37-7-81a (Harrison 1990 & Supp. 1991) (requiring that notice be
given no more than five days after filing of petition, with hearing no sooner than seven days
after filing of petition); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-5210 (1985) (requiring that notice be given no
less than five days prior to hearing); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28:54.C (West 1989) (requiring
that court provide notice of right to be present within 18 days if judicial commitment is in-
volved); MAss. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 123, § 35 (West Supp. 1992) (requiring that summons
and copy of petition be served and hearing scheduled "immediately" upon receipt of petition);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 253B.08(2) (West Supp. 1992) (requiring at least five days advance no-
tice of hearing, and at least two days notice of time and date).
151. For a discussion of these screening mechanisms, see NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE
COURTS, supra note 145, at 7-20; 1 PERLIN, supra note 87, at 197-200.
152. NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, supra note 145, at 7.
153. Id. These screening mechanisms exist as points of entry to provide initial assessments
in advance of a judicial hearing, and where appropriate, to obviate the need for such hearings.
154. Id. at 8.
155. Id.
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est and promoting judicial efficiency. 156  In practice, however, these
mechanisms are often circumvented by emergency commitments.
15 7
The use of screening mechanisms is a development generally associ-
ated with the civil commitment of mentally ill individuals (CMI). 55
However, their use may be equally appropriate for DDC proceedings.
Although there is little case law discussing the use of DDC screening
mechanisms as a prelude to a judicial hearing, the Minnesota Court of
Appeals has upheld a trial court's order to hold and evaluate an individ-
ual for long-term chemical dependency treatment at a state hospital
pending a full-scale hearing on a commitment petition.159 The individual
for whom DDC ultimately was instituted asserted that the screening pro-
cess did not comply with statutory requirements."6 In particular, he ob-
jected that the hospital staff did not interview him.1 6 1 The court rejected
this argument because it had not been raised at the trial court level, 62
indicating that it did not consider this a sufficiently egregious omission to
justify reversing the outcome and suggesting that it would allow screen-
ing officials considerable latitude in the conduct of these evaluations.
6
1
156. Id
157. Id.
158. One commentator has suggested that although there is as yet little case law on the use
of screening mechanisms in the involuntary commitment process, future developments can be
expected. 1 PERLIN, supra note 87, § 3.05, at 200.
159. See In re Galusha, 372 N.W.2d 843 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985). Under a Minnesota stat-
ute, "[a] proposed patient [could] be held for up to 72 hours if it [were] shown 'that serious
imminent physical harm to the proposed patient or others [was] likely unless the proposed
patient [was] apprehended.'" Id at 846 (quoting MINN. STAT. § 253B.07(6) (1984)). How-
ever, a court could order that a person continue to be held if at a preliminary hearing it found
"'by a preponderance of the evidence, that serious imminent physical harm to the patient or
others [was] likely' if the patient [was] released." Id (quoting MINN. STAT. § 253B.07(6)(d)
(1984)).
160. Id. at 846.
161. Id.
162. Id
163. Id. For an older case revealing a very different attitude toward a pre-hearing screening
mechanism, see In re James, 283 N.Y.S.2d 126, 131 (Sup. Ct.), rev'd sub nom. Narcotic Addic-
tion Control Conm'n v. James, 285 N.Y.S.2d 793 (App. Div. 1967), rev'd, 240 N.E.2d 29
(N.Y. 1968).
Under New York law, a judge could issue a warrant to have an individual picked up by
the police, taken to a narcotic addiction control facility, and held for up to 72 hours without a
hearing for a medical examination. Id at 134. The judge only needed a "reasonable belief"
that the person was a narcotic addict in order to issue the warrant, a belief that could be based
solely on the declaration of the petitioner. Id at 129. Furthermore, the individual did not
have to be informed of his or her rights, including the right to remain silent, until after the
medical examination. Id at 133.
the reviewing court found this process to be unacceptable, asserting that the individual's
fate would be sealed before being advised of his or her rights, that the pre-hearing steps were
critical, and that the subsequent hearing was a mere formality. Id. at 136-37. Instead, the
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E. Liability of Officials Initiating DDC
The potential liability of officials involved in initial DDC proceed-
ings has been discussed in a few reported cases. 64 Those cases that have
raised the issue generally have been predicated on legal grounds similar
to those raised in challenges to the commitment of mentally ill per-
sons;165 namely, that there was a violation of the individual's civil rights
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,166 that there was a tortious false arrest and im-
prisonment, 67 or that there was a tortious failure to respond or res-
cue. 168  Generally, when acting in good faith, the officials named as
defendants have been found to be immune from liability.'
69
For example, in Dick v. Watonwan County,170 a county prosecutor
who filed a DDC petition was deemed to have been carrying out his
prosecutorial function and entitled to absolute immunity regardless of his
alleged failure to investigate adequately the accusations involved.' 71 Re-
lying on an Eighth Circuit opinion, which determined that preparing a
civil commitment petition for a mentally ill individual was a protected
prosecutorial function, the court found no reason to distinguish the peti-
tioning process associated with DDC.171 It held that absolute immunity
extended only to the prosecutor's prosecutorial function, not to his inves-
court ruled that a "show cause" hearing must be held prior to hospitalizing the individual, at
which the court would explain to the individual his or her rights, including the right to remain
silent during the examination. Id. at 139.
164. See Jarrell v. Chemical Dependency Unit, 791 F.2d 373 (5th Cir. 1986); Dick v.
Watonwan County, 551 F. Supp. 983 (D. Minn. 1982), rev'd on other grounds, 738 F.2d 939
(8th Cir. 1984); Conner v. American Druggists Ins. Co., 495 So. 2d 990 (Ct. App.), cert.
denied, 497 So. 2d 1020 (La. 1986).
165. For a discussion of the bases on which the liability of mental health professionals has
been predicated, see Barbara A. Weiner, Provider-Patient Relations: Confidentiality and Lia-
bility, in THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW, supra note 87, at 559, 578-91.
166. See, eg., Jarrell, 791 F.2d at 374; Dick, 551 F. Supp. at 995. Federal law authorizes a
cause of action for deprivation under color of state law "of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws." 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
167. See, e.g., Dick, 551 F. Supp. at 985. The plaintiffs in this case also brought an action
for conspiracy to deprive the plaintiffs of their constitutional rights. Id.
168. See eg., Conner, 495 So. 2d at 991.
169. Cf Dick, 551 F. Supp. at 990-92 (stating that good faith immunity may apply to de-
fendant in § 1983 claim). A similar general rule applies to the actions of officials involved in
the civil commitment of mentally ill individuals. See Weiner, supra note 165, at 590-91.
170. 551 F. Supp. 983 (D. Minn. 1982), rev'd on other grounds, 738 F.2d 939 (8th Cir.
1984).
171. Id. at 992. Absolute immunity typically cloaks a public official from any type of
charge, regardless of the official's state of mind in carrying out his or her duties, whereas
qualified immunity only shields an official from actions carried out in good faith, with the
belief that the actions were within his or her authority. Id. at 990.
172. Id at 992 (citing Sebastian v. United States, 531 F.2d 900, 903 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 856 (1976)).
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tigative or administrative function.173 The court rejected the plaintiffs'
contention that the county prosecutor should be stripped of immunity
because of alleged prosecutorial misconduct, including allegations that
he failed to make an adequate investigation before preparing the commit-
ment petitions and that he had fabricated or at least embellished the ac-
cusations contained in them.174 The court ruled that a failure to
investigate adequately did not divest the county prosecutor of immunity
and that the falsification of evidence destroyed absolute immunity "only
in cases involving egregious prosecutorial misconduct, such as the com-
mission of perjury or the destruction of exculpatory evidence." 175 Sug-
gesting that prosecutors should be given broad latitude in preparing
DDC petitions, the court noted that the defendant was not accused of
"embellish[ing] or falsif[ying] all the allegations contained in the com-
mitment petition," and that a welfare official signed the petition, meaning
the prosecutor technically was not guilty of perjury. 
1 76
This case suggests that courts will also accord considerable latitude
to law enforcement officials responsible for carrying out DDC provisions.
Also, in Dick, the sheriff who enforced a judicial order of commitment
was found entitled to immunity if the order was facially valid and the
sheriff acted in good faith in taking the individual into custody.1
77
Although the sheriff, as he was executing the commitment order, made
comments to the effect that the arrest and confinement were wrong, the
court held that "[a]t most" the comments indicated that the sheriff "dis-
agreed with the law on which [the] arrest was based, not that he believed
the [commitment] orders were wrongfully obtained."' 178 At the time, the
sheriff had no indication that the orders of commitment were not valid,
and he believed he was carrying out his duty.179 The court noted that
"[a]ny personal disagreement [he had] with the law did not excuse him
from carrying out his duty to follow that law."' 80 The court concluded
that the sheriff had been acting in good faith in carrying out the commit-
ment orders, and was therefore entitled to immunity.' 8 '
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 992-93 (citations omitted).
176. Id. at 993.
177. Id. at 990.
178. Id. at 991.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 991-92.
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Similarly, in Conner v. American Druggists Insurance Co. ,182 two
deputy sheriffs were relieved of liability for failing to commit an individ-
ual who was subsequently found to be in need of commitment. 13 The
court held that their duty to take persons into protective custody was
discretionary, and as long as the officers did not negligently determine
that the person did not need help, they were not subject to liability." 4
In Conner, a man died after ingesting a vial full of pain killers fol-
lowing a drinking binge."" The sheriffs had been called by the man's
wife, who asked them to hospitalize her husband.'8 6 The sheriffs were
able, however, to rouse the man, who denied taking the pills and refused
their help.I87 After they left, the couple went to sleep, and the man died
during the night."" While the court recognized that once the deputies
undertook to help the man by responding to his wife's call they were
under a duty to do so correctly, the court nevertheless ruled that they
were not negligent because they made a careful investigation and were
convinced the man was not in danger.s 9 The court arrived at this con-
clusion although it was established that the deputies either were unaware
of or mistaken about their authority to take a person suffering from sub-
stance abuse into protective custody for hospitalization under a DDC
statute. 90 The court ruled that if the two deputies had reasonable
grounds for taking the actions they did, notwithstanding their ignorance
of their DDC statutory authority, they should not be found liable.'91
Other state and local officials involved in petitioning the court for
DDC have been entitled to qualified immunity if the officials were carry-
182. 495 So. 2d 990 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 497 So. 2d 1020 (La. 1986).
183. Id. at 994. The court stated:
The statute gives a peace officer the discretionary authority to take a person into
protective custody, provided reasonable grounds for such custody exists. Had the
officers taken the deceased into protective custody that night, certainly it could not
be disputed that they had reasonable grounds to do so. On the other hand, it is
equally indisputable that they had reasonable grotinds not to take him into protective
custody and transport him to the hospital. Likewise, their decision to leave the house
when they did was reasonable; there appeared to be no reason for further alarm.
[The deceased] insisted he had not swallowed any harmful pills. He did not look or
act like a man who was dangerously ill.
Id.
184. Id at 994-95.
185. Id. at 991.
186. Id. at 991-92.
187. Id at 992.
188. Id.
189. Id at 992-93.
190. Id. at 993.
191. Id. at 994.
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ing out their duty in a discretionary rather than a ministerial capacity.' 9 2
For example, in Dick, county welfare officials initiated DDC proceedings
against the parents of a fifteen-year-old girl based solely on her state-
ments. 193 The court found that the welfare officials did indeed "exer-
cise[ ] a great deal of discretion in the performance of their duties," and
were therefore "entitled to the protection of qualified immunity."'1 94
However, they were not immune if either: (1) there were no reasonable
grounds for their belief that DDC was appropriate and that the individ-
ual for whom commitment was proposed met commitment criteria; or
(2) they were not acting in good faith. 95 The court could have found a
lack of good faith if it were established that the officials distorted and
embellished the information they originally received.
196
In addition, a supervisory official not directly participating in the
DDC proceeding could be found liable if he or she failed "'to properly
train, supervise, direct or control'" a subordinate who instigated an ille-
gal DDC.19 7 This liability could be based on a showing that it was a
common practice of the agency to seek a petition for commitment with-
out attempting to independently verify the information provided by a
complaining individual, including a family member.'9 8
Similarly, the agency or county, as the committing officials' em-
ployer, could be found liable if the officials were acting pursuant to a
department or county policy or custom.199 However, courts have ruled
that the actions of a private treatment facility when it involuntarily de-
tains an individual pursuant to the state's statutory commitment schemes
do not constitute state action under the Fourteenth Amendment. °
192. See Dick v. Watonwan County, 551 F. Supp. 983, 995 (D. Minn. 1982), rev'd on other
grounds, 738 F.2d 939 (8th Cir. 1984). In addition, notwithstanding the availability of quali-
fied immunity, such officials have been found to be free of liability if they were not involved in
seeking the commitment, even though they may have taken steps that initiated the investiga-
tion that led to the petition for commitment, or if they complied with the statutory require-
ments. See id. at 993-96. As for the latter, in Dick, it was unresolved whether the officials
made reasonable efforts to obtain a physician's statement to accompany the commitment peti-
tion, whether the probable dangerousness requirement was satisfied, and whether the defend-
ants had considered less intrusive means short of immediately taking the individuals into
custody, such as seeking the suspension of their drivers' licenses. Id. at 994.
193. Id at 986.
194. Id at 995.
195. Iad
196. Id
197. See id (quoting Pearl v. Dobbs, 649 F.2d 608, 609 (8th Cir. 1981) (per curiam)).
198. Id
199. Id However, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the agency or county could not be held liable
for punitive damages. Dick, 551 F. Supp. at 996.
200. See, eg., Jarrell v. Chemical Dependency Unit, 791 F.2d 373, 374 (5th Cir. 1986).
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Even if the private facility was integrally involved in the state's program,
courts have found that there is no state action as is required for a § 1983
claim.
201
IV. JUDICIAL REVIEW
A. Procedural Rights
There has been considerable disagreement over the degree to which
an individual should be accorded stringent procedural safeguards as part
of DDC. The inherent dichotomy between the civil and criminal nature
of DDC proceedings is at the center of this controversy; the courts wres-
tle over which classification to use in determining the procedures re-
quired. Generally, courts have held that this determination must be
based on the actual consequences the commitment has on the individual,
rather than on the theoretical or abstract nature of the process. 202
For example, in imposing requirements associated with a criminal
proceeding, one court noted the stigma attached to DDC proceedings
including: their public nature; the potentially long-term duration of the
commitment; the possibility the committed person may be in the custody
of correctional authorities with an emphasis on control and confinement
and a lack of treatment alternatives; and, the possibility of imprisonment
should the committed person attempt to escape.203 Another court stated
that where the purpose of treatment appears to be punitive and is in actu-
ality only "a veneer for an extended jail term," the commitment should
201. See, eg., id. In Jarrell, the court stated:
Although the state may have forced Jarrell's confinement and treatment, he has not
alleged, and the record is barren of evidence to show, that the state's authority was
linked to the specific conduct of the private facility's employees complained of here.
There is no nexus between the state's authority and the conduct alleged to be uncon-
stitutional.... [T]he [facility] employees may have acted contrary to state law; but
the state did not direct them to do so.
Id. (footnote omitted).
202. See, eg., People v. Thomas, 19 Cal. 3d 630, 638, 566 P.2d 228, 232, 139 Cal. Rptr.
594, 598 (1977). In Thomas, the California Supreme Court stated:
[B]ecause involuntary commitment is incarceration against one's will regardless of
whether it is called "civil" or "criminal," the choice of standard of proof implicates
due process considerations which must be resolved by focusing not on the theoretical
nature of the proceedings but rather on the actual consequences of commitment to
the individual.
Id. (citation omitted); see also People v. Martinez, 106 Cal. App. 3d 524, 539, 165 Cal. Rptr.
160, 169 (1980) ("Such cases do show our Supreme Court's recognition that involuntary com-
mitment is incarceration against one's will regardless of whether it is called 'civil' or 'crimi-
nal.' "); People v. Garcia, 268 Cal. App. 2d 712, 716, 74 Cal. Rptr. 103, 106 (1969) ("We must,
then, disregard the civil-criminal dichotomy in determining the contention made to us.").
203. Thomas, 19 Cal. 3d at 638-40, 566 P.2d at 232-34, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 598-600.
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be treated as a criminal proceeding rather than a civil proceeding."° On
the other hand, some courts have focused on the civil nature of the pro-
ceeding, its non-punitive purpose, and the fact that "the program is in-
tended solely for the addict's benefit" in deciding not to apply criminal
standards to a DDC proceeding."0
To the extent the primary purpose of DDC appears to be to protect
the public (and not the individual) from the danger of drug use, a court is
likely to conclude that the state is acting pursuant to its police power and
that the court should apply more stringent criminal standards and re-
strictions. Alternatively, if the court views the purpose of DDC to be
truly rehabilitative and beneficial for the individual, reflecting the state's
exercise of its parens patriae power, the court is more likely to reject the
wholesale application of criminal standards and procedures. The dual
purpose of DDC as treatment of the individual and protection of the
public from the dangers associated with the use of drugs complicates this
analysis. 20 6 A court can find that the state is acting both to protect the
public and to promote the welfare of the individual, so the standard ap-
plied varies from court to court and from issue to issue. In determining
the appropriate procedures, a court may be swayed by its view of the
ultimate effectiveness of DDC treatment programs and the danger drug
abusers pose to the public.20"
B. The Right to a Jury Trial
Perhaps to keep the commitment hearing informal and swift,20 8
thereby providing an expeditious response to the treatment needs of the
204. People v. Fuller, 248 N.E.2d 17, 21 (N.Y. 1969).
205. Id; see also People v. Reynoso, 64 Cal. 2d 432, 435, 412 P.2d 812, 813, 50 Cal. Rptr.
468, 469 (1966) (stating in connection with ruling that protection from double jeopardy does
not apply to DDC hearing, that "[ommitment.".. does not imprison the subject, is not
punishment for crime, is not penal confinement, and the act is not a penal statute" and that
"commitment constitutes compulsory treatment of the addict"); In re De La 0, 59 Cal. 2d
128, 152, 378 P.2d 793, 809, 28 Cal. Rptr. 489, 505 ("The procedures ... are not intended as a
punishment for unlawful use or condition; by contrast, they are provided as a remedy or cura-
tive treatment."), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 856 (1963); People v. Lipscomb, 263 Cal. App. 2d 59,
62, 69 Cal. Rptr. 127, 128 (1968) ("Commitment proceedings for narcotic addiction are special
civil proceedings .... and Lipscomb agrees that civil rules governing the admissibility of
evidence should apply."); People v. Valdez, 260 Cal. App. 2d 895, 904, 67 Cal. Rptr. 583, 589
(1968) ("Surely it cannot be successfully urged that the difference between a conviction for a
crime and a commitment for treatment is so insubstantial that any classification based upon
such difference is arbitrary and has no substantial relation to the legitimate object of the
legislation.").
206. See supra notes 32-42 and accompanying text.
207. See infra notes 334-49 and accompanying text.
208. In the context of civil commitment in general, it has been noted that "[t]here seems
little doubt that the inclusion of jury trials would have a 'fairly drastic impact on the length of
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individual,2o 9 most states have not provided statutorily for a jury trial for
DDC. Only the District of Columbia and four of the twenty-four states
with statutory provisions specifically authorizing DDC have statutorily
provided for jury trial in DDC cases.210 In these jurisdictions, the court
must provide a jury trial if the individual to be committed demands
one.2 11 Although a court might order a jury trial without a statutory
requirement,2"2 no published opinions indicate that courts have done so
in a DDC proceeding.2 1 3
The case law that addresses aspects of the right to a jury trial is
found in the criminal context where DDC is considered in lieu of prose-
cution or sentencing. One court has stated that "[tihe issue in both pro-
ceedings is identical."2 4 The determination that an individual is a drug
dependent person must be made in both criminal and non-criminal pro-
ceedings, so arguably the appropriateness of such a determination being
made by a jury is the same in either context.
Among the cases that have addressed the use of juries in a DDC
proceeding, the position of the court depends on how the DDC proceed-
ing is characterized. For example, the California Supreme Court held
that the jury should only decide whether an individual is drug dependent
and should not address other collateral issues, such as one's amenability
the [involuntary civil commitment] hearing.'" I PERLIN, supra note 87, § 3.23, at 262 n.266
(alteration in original) (quoting Developments in the Law-Civil Commitment of the Mentally
Ill, 87 HARv. L. REv. 1190, 1294 n.175 (1974)).
209. The appropriateness of a jury trial in conjunction with the involuntary civil commit-
ment of mentally ill individuals has been the subject of debate, with advocates of the use of a
jury trial concerned that bench trials fail to adequately explore the issues. See id. at 260-65.
But see Developments in the Law-Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 87 HARv. L. REV.
1190, 1295 (1974) ("[A]dditional procedural fairness and community involvement ensured by
the jury trial is outweighed by the possibly substantial sacrifice of the state's interest in econ-
omy and informality.").
210. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 3108 (West 1984); D.C. CODE ANN. § 24-605
(1989); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-5210(a)(4) (1985 & Supp. 1989); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43A,
§ 5-212(B)(1) (West 1990); Act of June 10, 1969, ch. 543, 1969 Tex. Gen. Laws 1682 (repealed
1991). See generally Garcia & Keilitz, supra note 21, at 418-19, 419 tbl.1, 426-37 tbl.2 (sum-
marizing, classifying and comparing state statutes governing involuntary civil commitment of
drug dependent adults).
211. See supra note 210.
212. As discussed above, a court might be more inclined to recognize the right to a jury trial
in a DDC proceeding if it views the state as acting pursuant to its police rather than its parens
patriae powers, thereby invoking the constitutional right to a jury trial. Generally, however,
courts have been reluctant to find such a constitutional right in the involuntary civil commit-
ment context. See 1 PERLIN, supra note 87, § 3.23, at 260.
213. But see People v. Fuller, 248 N.E.2d 17, 22 (N.Y. 1969) (concluding that statute grant-
ing noncriminal addicts right to jury trial should be equally applicable to criminal defendant
convicted of unlawful possession of narcotic drug and subject to compulsory treatment).
214. Id.
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to treatment.2 15 The court indicated that amenability to treatment was
an issue best left to the treating professionals, and not properly deter-
mined until such professionals had been given a period of time to attempt
treatment.216 This opinion appeared to favor keeping proceedings as ex-
peditious as possible so that the individual may be quickly treated. Nine
years later, however, the same court ruled that when an individual has
requested a jury trial, he or she is also entitled to the right of a unani-
mous verdict.21 7 In issuing its ruling, which was likely to result in reduc-
ing the possibility of a DDC determination, the court placed heavy
emphasis on the criminal nature of the proceedings and appeared to rec-
ognize a need to protect the individual from the state in its exercise of its
police powers.2 18
C. The Right to Counsel
All twenty-four states with statutory provisions specifically author-
izing DDC, as well as the District of Columbia, recognize an individual's
right to counsel.2 19 In addition, the courts have widely recognized a
right to counsel for adults subject to civil commitment proceedings, and,
in most jurisdictions, adults are entitled to appointed counsel if they are
unable to afford an attorney."2
In CMI, however, courts have not extended the right to counsel to
the initial stages of the proceedings, such as the medical examination.2 2 1
215. See People v. Moore, 69 Cal. 2d 674, 685, 446 P.2d 800, 807, 72 Cal. Rptr. 800, 807
(1968), overruled on other grounds by People v. Thomas, 19 Cal. 3d 630, 566 P.2d 228, 139 Cal.
Rptr. 594 (1977); see also In re De La 0, 59 Cal. 2d 128, 151, 378 P.2d 793, 808, 28 Cal. Rptr.
489, 504 (holding that when DDC hearing is instituted after finding of guilt on criminal charge
and court subsequently certifies individual for DDC hearing, individual has no right to jury
trial, unless provided by statute, because individual already had right to jury trial in criminal
action), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 856 (1963).
216. See Moore, 69 Cal. 2d at 685, 446 P.2d at 807, 72 Cal. Rptr. at 807.
217. See People v. Thomas, 19 Cal. 3d 630, 566 P.2d 228, 139 Cal. Rptr. 594 (1977).
218. See id at 644, 566 P.2d at 236, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 602; see also People v. Malins, 24 Cal.
App. 3d 812, 818, 101 Cal. Rptr. 270, 275 (1972) (stating that personal waiver of right to jury
trial is required once jury trial is requested and that failure to appear does not constitute
waiver).
219. See Garcia & Keilitz, supra note 21, at 419; see also Burr v. Pryor, 468 F. Supp. 1314,
1317 (E.D. Ark. 1979) (requiring that hearing judge advise alcoholic of rights including right
to counsel if unable to afford counsel).
220. Barbara A. Weiner, Rights of Institutionalized Persons, in THE MENTALLY DISABLED
AND THE LAW, supra note 87, at 251, 284-88; 2 PERLIN, supra note 87, §§ 8.01-.38, at 739-
873.
221. See, eg., Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378 (M.D. Ala. 1974); see also 2 PERLIN,
supra note 87, § 8.04, at 750-51 (stating that courts did not extend right of representation to
psychiatric interview where presence of counsel might unduly interfere with objective evalua-
tion of individual's mental condition).
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In DDC proceedings a number of courts have held that an individual has
no right to counsel during the medical examination. 222 Among the ratio-
nales asserted for this holding is that the physical examination is a "non-
critical stage" of the proceedings2 23 because the medical examiner is not
acting as an agent of the prosecution in order to obtain evidence to be
used as part of a criminal prosecution; 224 the examination is used solely
for diagnostic purposes in a nonincriminating nature.225 The examina-
tion is conducted pursuant to the state's parens patriae power.226 How-
ever, at least one court has stated that "[t]he very basic fact is that it is
mainly the doctor's testimony and result of his physical examination
which will determine the outcome of any hearing involving the addict ' 227
and "a sick narcotic addict is desperately in need of counsel at this
time-even more than a fix.' ,,228
Furthermore, courts have found no right to counsel at other stages
of the proceedings. In People v. Hill,229 the court ruled that if counsel
was present throughout the trial, the absence of counsel when the jury
returned its verdict was not a sufficient basis for overturning a DDC
commitment absent a showing of prejudice.23°
Beyond these stages, counsel generally must be present unless there
has been a valid waiver of the right to counsel by the individual facing
commitment. Furthermore, a number of courts have held that for an
individual to knowingly and intelligently waive his or her legal rights,
222. See Johnson v. Woods, 323 F. Supp. 1393, 1395 (C.D. Cal. 1971); People v. Cande-
laria, 18 Cal. App. 3d 754, 757, 96 Cal. Rptr. 90, 92 (1971); People v. Clark, 272 Cal. App. 2d
294, 297, 77 Cal. Rptr. 50, 52 (1969); People v. Garcia, 268 Cal. App. 2d 712, 716, 74 Cal.
Rptr. 103, 106 (1969); People v. Valdez, 260 Cal. App. 2d 895, 904-05, 67 Cal. Rptr. 583, 589-
90 (1968); People v. Fuller, 248 N.E.2d 17, 22 (N.Y. 1969). But see In re James, 283 N.Y.S.2d
126, 148 (Sup. Ct.), rev'd sub nom. In re Narcotic Addiction Control Comm'n, 285 N.Y.S.2d
793 (App. Div. 1967), rev'd sub nor. Narcotic Addiction Control Comm'n v. James, 240
N.E.2d 29 (N.Y. 1968).
223. Johnson, 323 F. Supp. at 1396; Clark, 272 Cal. App. 2d at 297, 77 Cal. Rptr. at 52
(stating that medical examination is noncritical stage because, like handwriting exemplar, it is
basis for scientific conclusion that can be attacked through ordinary processes of cross-exami-
nation and use of one's own expert witnesses).
224. Garcia, 268 Cal. App. 2d at 716 n.5, 74 Cal. Rptr. at 106 n.5; Fuller, 248 N.E.2d at 21.
225. Fuller, 248 N.E.2d at 21.
226. Johnson, 323 F. Supp. at 1396.
227. In re James, 283 N.Y.S.2d 126, 148 (Sup. Ct.), rev'd sub nom. Narcotic Addiction
Control Comm'n v. James, 285 N.Y.S.2d 793 (App. Div. 1967), rev'd, 240 N.E.2d 29 (N.Y.
1968).
228. Id at 146.
229. 249 Cal. App. 2d 453, 57 Cal. Rptr. 551 (1967).
230. Id at 458, 57 Cal. Rptr. at 554. "Appellant has in no way pointed out how he was in
any respect prejudiced by his attorney's not being present at the time the jury returned its
verdict and the court ordered the existing commitment into full force." Id.
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counsel must be present.23' The court in Burr v. Pryor232 stated that it
had an obligation to protect the rights of those least able to protect them-
selves, and the obligation superseded any gain in judicial expediency that
might be obtained by allowing individuals to waive their rights absent the
advice of counsel. 233 The court indicated that the participation of coun-
sel in the waiver of rights not only protected the rights of the individual,
but ensured a more just result.2 34
Courts have not universally recognized a right to counsel for minors
facing possible civil commitment. For example, in Parham v. JR. ,235 the
United States Supreme Court ruled that a minor was not entitled to the
right to counsel if the minor's parents sought to involuntarily commit
him or her on mental illness grounds.236 However, a series of New York
state court opinions, written before the United States Supreme Court's
opinion, overturned DDC orders for minors because the minors were not
represented by counsel during the commitment process. 237 In People ex
rel. Wilkins v. Chinlund,233 the court overturned a DDC order even
though the court found "little doubt that petitioner was an addict at the
time" and that the trial court was acting in the best interests of the mi-
nor. 239 Furthermore, not only was the minor entitled to representation
231. Burr v. Pryor, 468 F. Supp. 1314 (E.D. Ark. 1979); In re Cruz, 62 Cal. 2d 307, 398
P.2d 412, 42 Cal. Rptr. 220 (1965); People ex rel Berdaguer v. Morrow, 302 N.Y.S.2d 628,
632 (Sup. Ct. 1969).
In Berdaguer, the trial judge was required to determine "that the alleged narcotic addict
waived the right to be represented by counsel having knowledge of the significance of his act
.... No answers were elicited from the alleged narcotic addicts which would establish either
their mental capacity or ability to waive their rights in a knowledgeable manner." Id. at 633.
"Every alleged narcotic addict should be represented either by his own or assigned counsel at
every stage of the proceedings leading to his certification .... " Id.
232, 468 F. Supp. 1314 (E.D. Ark. 1979).
233. Id. at 1316. "But this court has an obligation which supersedes and overrides all other
interests and that obligation is to insure [sic] and protect individual rights, freedoms, and
liberties. This is particularly true in those cases involving individuals who are least able to
protect themselves." Id
234. Id at 1317. The court stated:
The intervention of legal counsel prior to the waiver of rights by an alleged alcoholic
should not impose any undue burden on state judicial processes. To the contrary, the
participation of counsel should not only serve to protect the rights of an alleged
alcoholic but it should also insure [sic] that a waiver of rights, if made, is made with
knowledge of the consequences of the waiver.
Id.
235. 422 U.S. 584 (1979).
236. See id.; Secretary of Pub. Welfare v. Institutionalized Juveniles, 442 U.S. 640 (1979).
237. See People ex ret Wilkins v. Chinlund, 314 N.Y.S.2d 903 (App. Div. 1970); People ex
rel. Berdaguer v. Morrow, 302 N.Y.S.2d 628, 632 (Sup. Ct. 1969); Thompson v. Morrow, 293
N.Y.S.2d 974, 978 (Sup. Ct. 1968).
238. 314 N.Y.S.2d 903 (App. Div. 1970).
239. Id at 904.
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by counsel, any waiver of that right was required to be "knowing and
intelligent." z  Noting that the courts and the legislatures show "meticu-
lous care" in protecting the rights of minors in numerous areas by pro-
viding representation, the court in Thompson v. Morrow2 found that
minors are as entitled as adults to representation by counsel in a DDC
proceeding.242
D. Protection from Self-Incrimination and Patient-Physician Privilege
Courts addressing civil commitment of the mentally ill are split as to
whether the right against self-incrimination is applicable to the commit-
ment process, in particular during the medical examination.243 One ar-
gument for recognizing a right not to incriminate oneself during a
medical examination is that it is unfair to commit an individual based on
information provided by the individual at the psychiatric examination, at
which point the individual has not been informed of the ramifications of
providing this information. Utilizing the information without advance
warning to the individual will impair the ability of treatment staff to sub-
sequently forge a useful therapeutic relationship with the individual. 24
In opposition, courts and commentators have asserted that the individ-
ual's failure to participate in the medical examination would make such
examinations unworkable and ineffective, would make it impossible to
obtain a fair view of the individual's mental status, would eviscerate the
more fundamental right to a full and fair hearing, and would be contrary
to the benevolent intent of the proceedings.24
240. Id.; see also Thompson, 293 N.Y.S.2d at 978 ("I find that the relator has established by
a fair preponderance of the credible evidence that there was no valid waiver on his part of the
right to be represented by an attorney at the time of his certification... as a narcotic addict.").
241. 293 N.Y.S.2d 974 (Sup. Ct. 1968).
242. Id. at 976-78; see also Berdaguer, 302 N.Y.S.2d at 632 (holding that if youths were
minors at time of certification and did not have benefit of counsel at appearance before court,
they were denied due process and were entitled to habeas corpus relief).
243. See 1 PERLIN, supra note 87, § 3.24, at 265; Brakel, supra note 87, at 62. But see
RALPH REISNER & CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, LAW AND THE MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM:
CIVIL AND CRIMINAL ASPECTS 735 (2d ed. 1990).
244. See 1 PERLIN, supra note 87, § 3.25, at 266-69; Brakel, supra note 87, at 62.
245. See French v. Blackburn, 428 F. Supp. 1351, 1359 (M.D.N.C. 1977), aff'd, 443 U.S.
901 (1979); Ughetto v. Acrish, 494 N.Y.S.2d 943, 947 (Sup. Ct. 1985); 1 PERLIN, supra note
87, § 3.26, at 269-72; Brakel, supra note 87, at 62. In Ughetto, the Supreme Court of New
York stated:
This distinction is critical with respect to the privilege against self-incrimination be-
cause there is no way to obtain a fair view of the plaintiff's mental status without a
psychiatric interview .... In these circumstances, the interest of the individual in
being free from "incriminating" himself does not predominate, as it does in a crimi-
nal case, over the interest of the state, and the patient for that matter, in a just and
correct result. Essentially, the privilege against self-incrimination must give way to
ensure that the more fundamental right, in this context, to a full and fair hearing is
[Vol. 26:39
November 1992] CIVIL COMMITMENT FOR DRUG DEPENDENCY 75
Most of the case law dealing with the privilege against self-incrimi-
nation in a DDC proceeding concerns the medical examination that pre-
cedes the commitment hearing. The self-incrimination privilege often
overlaps a statutory patient-physician privilege and the right to coun-
sel.' In the context of DDC proceedings, courts have generally held
that the right against self-incrimination is inapplicable-at least during
the medical examination.2 47 The courts have placed emphasis on several
factors in these decisions: (1) the parenspatriae nature of DDC; (2) the
nonincriminating, diagnostic nature of the examination and the fact that
the information generated could not be used in conjunction with a crimi-
nal charge; and (3) the importance of ensuring that the physician's
conclusion is accurate, which could not be ensured if there were impedi-
ments to the free exchange of information between the physician and the
person potentially in need of treatment.248
In People v. Benedict,249 the court did not address whether a right
against self-incrimination exists. However, the court did conclude that a
DDC order would not be disturbed if self-incriminating statements,
which were wrongfully obtained, did not influence the evidence presented
at trial.250 The court decided this even though those statements may
have served as the basis for initiating the DDC process. 251 In opposition,
not compromised. The privilege against self-incrimination therefore does not apply
to the civil commitment proceedings at issue here.
494 N.Y.S.2d at 947.
246. See supra notes 222-28 and accompanying text.
247. See People v. Candelaria, 18 Cal. App. 3d 754,757, 96 Cal. Rptr. 90, 92 (1971); People
v. Garcia, 268 Cal. App. 2d 712, 716,74 Cal. Rptr. 103, 106-07 (1969); People v. Lipscomb,
263 Cal. App. 2d 59, 68, 69 Cal. Rptr. 127, 132 (1968); People v. Fuller, 248 N.E.2d 17 (N.Y.
1969). But see In re James, 283 N.Y.S.2d 126, 148 (Sup. Ct.), rev'd sub nom. In re Narcotic
Addiction Control Comm'n, 285 N.Y.S.2d 793 (App. Div. 1967), rev'd sub nom. Narcotic
Addiction Control Comm'n v. James, 240 N.E.2d 29 (N.Y. 1968).
248. See Garcia, 268 Cal. App. 2d at 716, 74 Cal. Rptr. at 106; Lipscomb, 263 Cal. App. 2d
at 63-66, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 129-31; Fuller, 248 N.E.2d at 21.
249. 2 Cal. App. 3d 400, 82 Cal. Rptr. 759 (1969).
250. Id at 404-05, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 762.
251. IdL The appellant had initially been found to be a narcotic drug addict at a judge-only
trial. Id at 401-02, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 760. Subsequently, he requested and received a jury trial
at which the same finding was entered, and he was then committed to the California Rehabili-
tation Center. Id at 402, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 760. After initiating arrest, the arresting officer
informed the appellant of his constitutional rights, including his right to remain silent. Id
The appellant claimed "that since he was under the influence of drugs at the time there could
not have been a voluntary and intelligent waiver of his constitutional rights." Id at 404, 82
Cal. Rptr. at 762. Thus, the testimony of the arresting officer, which was received at the judge-
only trial, should have been stricken and the commitment overturned. Id. at 404, 82 Cal.
Rptr. at 761-62. However, the court, noting that the arresting officer did not testify at the jury
trial, found:
The only witness the jury heard was Dr. Patrick Lavelle who testified that he ex-
amined appellant on November 1, 1968, and formed the opinion that he was a nar-
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the court in People v. Lipscomb 2 2 acknowledged that failing to recognize
a right against self-incrimination during the medical examination creates
the possibility that the examinee's statements may substantially contrib-
ute to his or her subsequent commitment.25 3 This creates a difficult di-
lemma.2 4  However, the Lipscomb court determined that both the
individual and society were better served by not recognizing such a right
in this context.2 5 Instead it adopted a rule that maximized the informa-
tion available to the examiner and the court, thereby increasing the likeli-
hood of appropriate outcomes.25 6
Because the right to be protected against self-incrimination in the
commitment process is generally discussed in the context of the medical
examination, it often overlaps with statutorily authorized patient-physi-
cian and patient-psychologist privileges. The rationale for finding the pa-
tient-physician privilege inapplicable to DDC proceedings is similar to
that used in the context of self-incrimination.25 7 Thus, the patient's con-
sent is not required before the results of an examination are entered into
evidence at the commitment hearing. 25 8 This is true as long as the indi-
vidual was informed of the purpose of the examination259 and there was
cotic addict in the early withdrawal stages based on his long history of narcotic use,
use of narcotics within the last 24 hours and evidence of both fresh and old tracks on
appellant's arms and the reaction of the pupils of his eyes. Thus, the statements of
which appellant complains were never heard by the jury which ultimately found him
to be addicted to narcotic drugs.
Id at 404, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 762.
252. 263 Cal. App. 2d 59, 69 Cal. Rptr. 127 (1968).
253. Id at 66, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 131.
254. Id
255. Id
256. Id. at 67, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 131. The court stated:
From the point of view of the individual an erroneous decision on civil commitment
tends to operate to his long-term disadvantage.... And... from the point of view of
society, any change in the reliability of the commitment process which increases the
possibility that persons will be committed who should not be committed and persons
discharged who should not be discharged operates to the prejudice of the social
order.
Id
257. Lipscomb, 263 Cal. App. 2d at 63-64, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 129 (holding inadmissible in
criminal proceedings against patient evidence of violation of narcotics laws found during phy-
sician's examination).
258. Id at 62, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 128; In re Redcloud, 359 N.W.2d 710, 713 (Minn. Ct. App.
1984); Dudley v. State ex reL Dudley, 730 S.W.2d 51 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987). It should be noted
that often this exception to the doctor-patient privilege is written into the statute that estab-
lishes the privilege. See Lipscomb, 263 Cal. App. 2d at 63, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 129; Dudley, 730
S.W.2d at 54.
259. Lipscomb, 263 Cal. App. 2d at 62-63, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 128. Prior to his admission to
the county jail infirmary, appellant had been advised in writing that he was being admitted to
determine whether he was addicted to narcotics. Id.; see also Dudley, 730 S.W.2d at 54 ("The
trial court properly limited Dr. Rustin's testimony to information discussed or disclosed after
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no indication of deception, misrepresentation or unfairness.26° However,
the privilege is deemed inapplicable only to the extent that the examina-
tion was conducted in furtherance of the DDC proceeding or addresses
issues concerning the DDC proceeding.261 Other information is to be
excluded.2 62
Interestingly, these rulings suggest that courts may be more likely to
recognize the right against self-incrimination and the patient-physician
privilege when dealing with commitment of the mentally ill.263 In part,
this may be a consequence of the continuing perception that mentally ill
persons are more deserving of these rights than are drug dependent per-
sons, possibly because the mentally ill are not perceived as a "menace" or
source of "contamination."1264 However, these cases do not resolve cer-
tain empirical questions that could help determine whether these rights
and privileges should be equally applicable in DDC and CMI proceed-
ings. Are drug abusers less likely to require assurances of confidentiality
than mentally ill persons? Do drug abusers deserve less sympathy than
mentally ill persons? Are physicians who conduct an examination as
part of a DDC proceeding more likely to testify about non-medical is-
sues, such as dangerousness?
In applying these privileges, the courts have not made any distinc-
tion based on the status of the examining professional. Apparently, it
does not matter whether the examiner has prior knowledge of the indi-
vidual being examined that might influence his or her opinion. As long
as the examining physician warns the patient that their communications
will no longer be confidential, the doctor who saw the patient on a volun-
tary basis before the commitment process was initiated may testify re-
appellant received a warning of the nonconfidentiality of the information. Thus, no testimony
was introduced in violation of the physician/patient privilege.").
260. Lipscomb, 263 Cal. App. 2d at 63, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 127 ('The record contains no
suggestion of trickery or misrepresentation or equivocal conduct which might have led Lips-
comb to believe he was entering the infirmary for medical treatment."); Redcloud, 359 N.W.
2d at 713 ('If a proposed patient is denied access to his medical records, they may be excluded
from evidence.").
261. See, e.g., Lipscomb, 263 Cal. App. 2d at 63, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 129 (noting that "the
doctor will only testify at the commitment hearing to matters relevant to the primary purpose
of the examination").
262. See id.; Dudley, 730 S.W.2d at 54.
263. 1 PERLIN, supra note 87, § 3.34, at 300. In a case involving the commitment of a
mentally ill individual, the court held that the confidentiality of the psychiatrist-patient rela-
tionship "fosters the patient's interest in privacy and the public's interest in effective treatment,
as well as the public's interest in encouraging disturbed persons to seek therapy without fear of
publicity." In re Kathleen M., 493 A.2d 472, 475 (N.H. 1985).
264. D.C. CODE ANN. § 24-601 (1989).
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garding information obtained in a medical examination conducted
subsequent to this warning as part of the DDC proceeding.265
E. Waiver of Rights
Many states permit a potential DDC candidate to waive his or her
rights. 2 " Indeed, courts have noted that such waivers should be en-
couraged because they expedite the process.267 However, courts may still
closely scrutinize the purported waiver to eliminate the possibility that
the candidate for DDC is incompetent to make such a waiver.
2 61
The candidate for DDC must make an intelligent and knowing
waiver of his or her rights.2 69 For example, merely signing a printed
form in the rush of events, without participating in filling out the form,
may not constitute an intelligent and knowing waiver.2 70  Similarly,
courts have invalidated waivers by unrepresented minors.271 Courts have
held that establishing a waiver in the DDC context will require a greater
showing of informed consent than is routinely associated with either
civil 272 or criminal proceedings.273 A waiver "must be carefully scruti-
nized [by the court] to determine that the person making it had the phys-
ical and emotional capacity to do so under all the circumstances of the
case." 27a Courts have also held that a DDC candidate's waiver of rights
265. See Dudley, 730 S.W.2d at 54.
266. See In re Jones, 61 Cal. 2d 325, 392 P.2d 269, 38 Cal. Rptr. 509 (1964), cert. denied,
379 U.S. 980 (1965); People ex rel Gordon v. Murphy, 293 N.Y.S.2d 567 (App. Div. 1968).
Contra In re Walker, 71 Cal. 2d 54, 453 P.2d 456, 77 Cal. Rptr. 16 (1969); People v. Malins,
24 Cal. App. 3d 812, 101 Cal. Rptr. 270 (1972).
267. See In re Cruz, 62 Cal. 2d 307, 313, 398 P.2d 412, 415, 42 Cal. Rptr. 220, 223 (1965);
In re Jones, 61 Cal. 2d at 326 n.6, 392 P.2d at 272 n.6, 38 Cal. Rptr. at 512 n.6. But see Burr
v. Pryor, 468 F. Supp. 1314, 1316 (E.D. Ark. 1979); Malins, 24 Cal. App. 3d at 818, 101 Cal.
Rptr. at 274-75.
268. See Burr, 468 F. Supp. at 1316; Walker, 71 Cal. 2d at 57, 453 P.2d at 458-59, 77 Cal.
Rptr. at 18-19; Malins, 24 Cal. App. 3d at 819, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 275; People ex rel. Wilkins v.
Chinlund, 314 N.Y.S.2d 903, 904 (App. Div. 1970).
269. See Walker, 71 Cal. 2d at 57, 453 P.2d at 458, 77 Cal. Rptr. at 18-19; Malins, 24 Cal.
App. 3d at 817-18, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 274; People ex rel Berdaguer v. Morrow, 302 N.Y.S.2d
628, 632 (Sup. Ct. 1969).
270. See Walker, 71 Cal. 2d at 59 n.3, 453 P.2d at 459 n.3, 77 Cal. Rptr. at 19 n.3. But see
Cruz, 62 Cal. 2d at 312-13, 398 P.2d at 415, 42 Cal. Rptr. at 223 (upholding waiver by printed
form augmented by interrogation of individual by presiding judge in case in which individual
was advised by counsel and underwent initial medical examination).
271. See Wilkins, 314 N.Y.S.2d at 904; Berdaguer, 302 N.Y.S.2d at 632; Thompson v. Mor-
row, 293 N.Y.S.2d 974, 978 (Sup. Ct. 1968).
272. See Malins, 24 Cal. App. 3d at 819, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 275.
273. See Burr v. Pryor, 468 F. Supp. 1314, 1316 (E.D. Ark. 1979); Walker, 71 Cal. 2d at
57, 453 P.2d at 459, 77 Cal. Rptr. at 19.
274. Walker, 71 Cal. 2d at 57, 453 P.2d at 459, 77 Cal. Rptr. at 19; see also Burr, 468 F.
Supp. at 1316 (decree that required waiver of rights to occur in presence of probate judge);
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cannot include a waiver of a required medical examination because the
examination is necessary to determine the validity of other waivers.275
The candidate may not waive assistance of counsel because such assist-
ance is necessary to understand the ramifications of the waivers.276
Courts have stated that such waivers must be closely scrutinized be-
cause "the person purporting to make the waiver is in an altered physio-
logical or psychological state, the characteristic of all narcotics
addicts."2 7 7 At least one court has noted the particular vulnerability of
such individuals.278 In addition, because such waivers may require a
high level of legal sophistication, the DDC candidate should not be re-
quired to demand his or her rights, and, thus, silence or a failure to ap-
pear should not be adjudged to constitute a waiver.279 Furthermore,
because of the serious ramifications of such waivers, one court has held
that counsel cannot expressly or inadvertently waive the rights of the
DDC candidate without the concurrence of the client.28°
In general, commentators have viewed the waiver of rights by a
DDC candidate in much the same way as the waiver of rights by an
individual being considered for CMI.25 1 Whether mental illness or drug
dependency is more likely to limit an individual's ability to competently
execute a waiver has not yet been addressed. As a result, it is not clear
whether waivers by one group or the other should be more closely scruti-
nized by the courts.
Berdaguer, 302 N.Y.S.2d at 632 (requiring court to follow statutorily prescribed procedures to
determine whether alleged narcotics addict waived right to counsel).
275. See Walker, 71 Cal. 2d at 59, 453 P.2d at 460, 77 Cal. Rptr. at 20. The California
Supreme Court stated:
An examination by court-appointed physicians in waiver cases thus serves to protect
the volunteer from a commitment entered into as a result of mistake, duress, depres-
sion or fear; indeed, it also protects the state, by assuring that all persons committed
to its overburdened rehabilitation facilities are genuinely in need of the services there
provided.
276. Burr, 468 F. Supp. at 1315-16; Berdaguer, 302 N.Y.S.2d at 631.
277. Walker, 71 Cal. 2d at 57, 453 P.2d at 459, 77 Cal. Rptr. at 19; see also Berdaguer, 302
N.Y.S.2d at 632 (noting that relators were "incapacitated" as result of narcotics use, court
found waivers were not knowing).
278. See Burr, 468 F. Supp. at 1316.
279. In re Jones, 61 Cal. 2d 325, 329-30, 392 P.2d 269, 272, 38 Cal. Rptr. 509, 512 (1964),
cert. denied, 379 U.S. 980 (1965); see also Burr, 468 F. Supp. at 1317 ("In no event shall a
waiver be included with the papers served on the alleged alcoholic which can be signed by the
alleged alcoholic without a court appearance.").
280. See People v. Mains, 24 Cal. App. 3d 812, 820, 101 Cal. Rptr. 270, 276 (1972).
281. See 1 PERLIN, supra note 87, § 3.35, at 301.02; Brakel, supra note 87, at 71.
80 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
F. Burden of Proof Requirements
The standard of proof required to establish that a drug dependent
person should be committed against his or her will has varied in past
decades. Prior to the early 1970s, courts adopted the "preponderance of
the evidence" standard.2" 2 It was argued that a lesser burden of proof
was necessary because: DDC is civil in nature283 and has a rehabilitative
goal;284 the deprivation of liberty should only last as long as necessary to
rehabilitate the individual;285 and medical diagnoses are fraught with in-
herent uncertainties.28 6 Because courts have considered the impact of an
erroneous determination relatively minor, they have applied this lesser
standard. The preponderance of the evidence standard was also widely
applied in CMI,28 7 with the two types of proceedings found analogous for
purposes of determining the applicable standard of proof.288
During the 1970s, courts became more concerned with protecting
the liberty interests of candidates. Courts imposed a greater burden of
proof on the state when it sought civil commitment for both DDC and
CMI individuals.28 9 In 1977, the California Supreme Court extended the
reasoning of a case involving the civil commitment of a mentally disor-
dered sex offender to a DDC proceeding, and applied the higher criminal
law standard of "beyond a reasonable doubt" to the burden of proof re-
quirements at the DDC hearing.2 90 The court decided to adopt a higher
burden of proof after determining that the DDC proceedings "seriously
put at risk both the personal liberty and the good name of the individ-
ual." '291 Although many courts gradually adopted the criminal law stan-
282. See People v. Moore, 69 Cal. 2d 674, 685, 446 P.2d 800, 807, 72 Cal. Rptr. 800, 807
(1968), overruled on other grounds by People v. Thomas, 19 Cal. 3d 630, 566 P.2d 228, 139 Cal.
Rptr. 594 (1977); People v. Valdez, 260 Cal. App. 2d 895, 903, 67 Cal. Rptr. 583, 588 (1968),
overruled by People v. Thomas, 19 Cal. 3d 630, 566 P.2d 228, 139 Cal. Rptr. 594 (1977);
People v. Fuller, 248 N.E.2d 17 (N.Y. 1969).
283. See Moore, 69 Cal. 2d at 685, 72 Cal. Rptr. at 807.
284. See Valdez, 260 Cal. App. 2d at 904, 67 Cal. Rptr. at 589; Fuller, 248 N.E.2d at 22.
285. See Fuller, 248 N.E.2d at 22.
286. See Valdez, 260 Cal. App. 2d at 904, 67 Cal. Rptr. at 589.
287. See Daniel Share, The Standard of Proof in Involuntary Civil Commitment Proceed-
ings, 1977 DET. C.L. REv. 209, 233.
288. See Fuller, 248 N.E.2d at 22.
289. For a discussion of the cases discussing the burden of proof in CMI proceedings, see 1
PERLIN, supra note 87, § 3.37, at 305-08; Brakel, supra note 87, at 67.
290. People v. Thomas, 19 Cal. 3d 630, 632-33, 566 P.2d 228, 229, 139 Cal. Rptr. 594, 595
(1977).
291. Ia at 638, 566 P.2d at 232, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 598; see also id. at 644, 566 P.2d at 236,
139 Cal. Rptr. at 602 ("[A] person committed as a narcotics addict suffers so severe a curtail-
ment of liberty and so lingering a moral stigma that he is entitled to the same standard of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt accorded to a criminal defendant.").
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dards in civil commitment cases, a great range of standards continued to
be applied in different jurisdictions.292
Courts adopting either a reasonable doubt or a preponderance of the
evidence standard found their positions undercut in 1979, when the
United States Supreme Court addressed the requisite standard of proof to
be applied in cases. involving the commitment of persons with mental
illness. In Addington v. Texas,293 the Court dismissed the preponderance
of the evidence standard as failing to adequately safeguard against the
potential erroneous commitment of individuals.294 It also refused to re-
quire the beyond a reasonable doubt standard, finding it more applicable
to criminal trials. 295 The Court found that the State was not exercising
its power in a punitive sense at a CMI proceeding, so such proceedings
were not analogous to criminal prosecutions.296 It also found that civil
commitment differed from criminal trial because in civil commitment
there are continuous opportunities for an erroneous commitment to be
corrected. Moreover, a genuinely mentally ill individual may suffer as a
result of not being committed.2 97 Furthermore, the civil commitment
inquiry does not involve straightforward factual questions, but is based
on medical diagnoses, which may inherently lack sufficient certainty to
reach the beyond a reasonable doubt standard.298 The Court ruled that it
was proper for states to adopt an intermediate standard of clear and
convincing proof.29 9 The Court also permitted states, if they so choose,
to impose a higher burden of proof than clear and convincing for
CMI.3°° Thus, the Court attempted to balance individual rights with the
needs of the state and the individual.
Although Addington reviewed a CMI procedure, it also has had an
impact on DDC procedures. Since Addington, most states have enacted
provisions that set the burden of proof necessary to commit a drug de-
pendent person at the clear and convincing level.30 1 Some states still em-
292. 1 PERLIN, supra note 87, § 3.37, at 307.
293. 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
294. Id at 426. One commentator noted that a trend to extend the applicability of the
beyond a reasonable doubt standard to CMI proceedings came to "an abrupt halt... with the
United States Supreme Court decision in Addington v. Texas holding that 'clear and convinc-
ing' proof is sufficient for civil commitment." Brakel, supra note 87, at 67 (quoting Addington
v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 433 (1979)).
295. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 431 (1979).
296. Id. at 428.
297. Id at 429.
298. Id
299. Id at 433.
300. Id (approving standard of "clear, unequivocal and convincing" proof).
301. See, eg., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 253B.09(l) (West 1982 & Supp. 1992); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 25-03.1-19 (1989). For recent examples of cases in which the clear and convincing
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ploy the beyond a reasonable doubt standard, at least to parts of the
commitment hearing, such as the determination of whether the individ-
ual is a drug abuser.302
V. TREATMENT OF THE DRUG DEPENDENT PERSON
A. Interrelationship Between Involuntary and Voluntary Status
Statutes dealing with DDC generally include provisions relating to
the voluntary commitment of DDC candidates.30 3 Virtually every state
has statutory authority for the voluntary treatment of the mentally ill. 304
It has been recognized that drug dependency does not render an individ-
ual per se incompetent to voluntarily submit to treatment, and that vol-
untary commitment should be encouraged because it can conserve the
resources of both the parties and the judiciary. 05
Once a person initiates the process of seeking voluntary treatment
for his or her drug dependency (typically by filing a petition with the
court), courts may require the person to undergo a medical examination
to determine whether there is an actual need for treatment.30 6 The court-
imposed medical examination serves to ensure that the action truly is
voluntary, which protects the interests of the individual, and to ensure
that limited treatment resources are being allocated to individuals truly
in need, which protects the interests of the state.30 7 It also has been held
that counsel for the individual cannot "volunteer" his or her client for
voluntary treatment against his or her client's wishes.308 However, in
one case, an order for treatment was not rescinded although the individ-
ual claimed he was misled about the treatment, misunderstood the nature
of the proceedings, and was under the influence of narcotics at the time
evidence standard was applied, see In re Galusha, 372 N.W.2d 843, 846 (Minn. Ct. App.
1985); In re Redcloud, 359 N.W.2d 710, 712 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984).
302. See, eg., HAw. REv. STAT. § 334-60.2 (1985 & Supp. 1989).
303. See, ag., LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 28:50 (West 1977); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 43-2-5
(Michie 1989); CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-378 (West 1986 & Supp. 1990) (repealed 1990).
304. 1 PERLIN, supra note 87, § 3.69, at 407.
305. See In re Jones, 61 Cal. App. 2d 325, 329 n.6, 392 P.2d 269, 272 n.6, 38 Cal. Rptr. 509,
512 n.6 (1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 980 (1965).
306. See In re Walker, 71 Cal. 2d 54, 59, 453 P.2d 456, 460, 77 Cal. Rptr. 16, 20 (1969); see
also CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 3100 (West 1984) (procedures for voluntary commitment of
narcotics addicts); id, § 3100.6 ("Within 24 hours of admittance, a physician shall conduct an
examination to determine whether the person is addicted to the use of narcotics .... ").
307. See Walker, 71 Cal. 2d at 59, 453 P.2d at 460, 77 Cal. Rptr. at 20; see also Narcotic
Rehabilitation Act of 1966, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3411-3426 (1988) (stating that individual seeking
voluntary commitment for treatment of narcotic addiction should be ordered committed to
custody of Surgeon General for hospital confinement for examination period not to exceed 30
days).
308. See Jones, 61 Cal. App. 2d at 330, 392 P.2d at 273, 38 Cal. Rptr. at 513.
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he volunteered for treatment." 9 The court concluded that at the time of
the initial voluntary commitment the individual was appraised of, and in
fact did understand, the nature of the proceedings.31 °
If a voluntarily-admitted patient seeks to end treatment, but medical
authorities believe it is appropriate to continue treatment, the conversion
from voluntary to involuntary status may be provided for by statute. A
statute may require medical personnel at the treatment facility to file a
petition with the court seeking conversion and to provide for the release
of the individual within a given period of time if a petition is not filed.31'
An early case rejected the use of a contractual agreement in which an
individual agreed to comply with a voluntary drug treatment program to
prevent the individual from leaving the program. 312 However, if an indi-
vidual refuses to cooperate in a treatment program or disrupts it, the
voluntary commitment may be terminated and the individual discharged
from the program.
313
Some statutes pertaining to DDC provide that individuals commit-
ted involuntarily can change their status to voluntary by providing writ-
ten notice, subject to the approval of the head of the treatment facility.
314
One of the concerns raised in conjunction with similar provisions for
mentally ill patients is that such patients may prematurely seek changes
309. See Ortega v. Rasor, 291 F. Supp. 748, 752 (S.D. Fla. 1968).
310. kd; see also Lolley v. Charter Woods Hosp., 572 So. 2d 1223 (Ala. 1990) (holding that
voluntary patient does not have false imprisonment claim against hospital that refused to dis-
charge her after she completed detoxification program).
311. See, eg., MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 253B.04(2) (West 1982 & Supp. 1992).
312. See Ex parte Lloyd, 13 F. Supp. 1005 (E.D. Ky. 1936). In Lloyd, the petitioner was
initially admitted to a "narcotic farm" upon the condition that he execute a written agreement
stipulating that he would remain for such time as the staff considered necessary to effect a cure,
or until he was cured. Id at 1005. The staff was authorized to use any reasonable method of
restraint to prevent his premature departure. Id The court refused to enforce this contract.
Id at 1009. It concluded that such retention was contrary to the Fifth and Thirteenth
Amendments of the Constitution and to the spirit of the law authorizing voluntary treatment,
which the court characterized as "charitable and benevolent" rather than "penal or criminal."
Id The court ruled that such patients were entitled to withdraw from treatment, and that
"compliance with such [contractual] terms and observance of all prescribed rules and regula-
tions [of the institution] may be enforced so long as they voluntarily remain as patients or
inmates of the institution, but no longer." Id; see also U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person
shall... be deprived of life., liberty, or property, without due process of law .... ."); i d amend.
XIII, § 1 ("Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime
whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any
place subject to their jurisdiction.").
313. See Lloyd, 13 F. Supp. at 1007; see also In re Redcloud, 359 N.W.2d 710, 712, 714
(Minn. Ct. App. 1984) (affirming trial court order imposing involuntary inpatient treatment in
case in which individual refused to cooperate with voluntary treatment thereby foreclosing
other options).
314. See, e.g., MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 253B.05(4) (West 1982 & Supp. 1992).
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in status in order to gain additional freedoms, including the ability to
leave the facility. This may place society at risk."'5 Courts have not yet
addressed whether DDC candidates are more or less likely to seek such
changes in status prematurely, and whether such changes are more or
less likely to place society at risk. However, in light of reported high
relapse rates among persons voluntarily committed to federal narcotics
hospitals, the California Supreme Court has asserted that involuntary
commitment may be a prerequisite to successful treatment of many drug
dependent individuals.316
Generally, courts considering the conversion of a mentally ill per-
son's status from voluntary to involuntary, have reached similar conclu-
sions regarding the rights of the voluntary patient.3 17 They also have
held that involuntary proceedings may not be instituted against a volun-
tary patient absent written notice of the patient's desire to leave, 318 and
that a patient with a mental illness seeking to change his or her status
from involuntary to voluntary has the right to a judicial hearing if that
change may be opposed. 1 Perhaps this presages subsequent develop-
ments with regard to DDC.
B. Use of the Least Restrictive Alternative
The concept that an individual's liberty should be restricted only to
the extent necessary to effectuate treatment, usually referred to as the
least restrictive alternative (LRA) principle, has been the subject of a
great deal of discussion in the field of mental health law, particularly in
315. NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, supra note 145, at 57.
316. See In re Cruz, 62 Cal. 2d 307, 314, 398 P.2d 412, 416, 42 Cal. Rptr. 220, 224 (1965).
The California Supreme Court stated:
The security problem may nonetheless be urgent .... First, many of the persons
committed as addicts have long records of petty lawbreaking and have manifested
little respect for authority in any form. Second, the physical and psychological grip
of narcotics addiction is so strong that at some point in the treatment process many
addicts will tend to rebel and turn uncooperative... ; yet if the program is to have
any hope of long-term success it must remain compulsory, a fact statistically attested
to by the high relapse rate of persons voluntarily committed to the federal narcotics
hospitals.
Id (citations omitted).
317. See generally I PERLIN, supra note 87, § 3.70, at 413 (noting lack of cases and com-
mentaries discussing whether voluntary patients are truly voluntary); Samuel J. Brakel, Volun-
tary Admission, in THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW, supra note 87, at 177
(discussing reasons behind specific statutory regulations regarding admittance of mentally ill
persons to treatment institutions).
318. See, eg., In re Hays, 465 N.E.2d 98 (Il. 1984); In re Clement, 340 N.E.2d 217, 219
(Ill. App. Ct. 1975).
319. See, eg., In re Buttonow, 244 N.E.2d 677, 682 (N.Y. 1968).
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the context of involuntary civil commitment.3 20 Commentators have as-
serted that the LRA doctrine is widely applicable to CMI proceedings.
321
However, considerable backlash has accompanied the application of
the LRA doctrine to CMI proceedings. The doctrine has been associated
with the deinstitutionalization movement and is sometimes perceived as
contributing to the premature return to the community of many individ-
uals with a mental illness.3 22 To the extent that drug dependent persons
are perceived to be more dangerous than individuals with a mental ill-
ness, and community treatment programs are not made available to drug
dependent persons, 323 there may be greater resistance to the application
of the LRA doctrine to DDC.
Courts addressing DDC, however, also have employed the LRA
doctrine. For example, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals re-
versed the decision of a trial court on grounds that it failed to consider
treatment options other than inpatient commitment at a specific facil-
ity.3 24 The California Supreme Court held that if there is no alternative
to institutional confinement, such as a half-way house, rather than deter-
mining that the individual should not be subject to DDC, the DDC can-
didate must be afforded increased procedural protections at the DDC
320. 1 PERLIN, supra note 87, § 3.46, at 341.
321. See id. at 349; Weiner, supra note 220, at 267.
322. Brakel, supra note 87, at 31; Weiner, supra note 220, at 266-67.
323. See Need for Drug Abuse Treatment Exceeds Availability, Survey Finds 530,000 Slots,
633,000 Patients, 107,000 on Waiting Lists, 22(9) SUBSTANCE ABUSE REP. 1, 1 (1991) ("Of the
over 107,000 people waiting for drug abuse treatment, most were waiting for outpatient treat-
ment, with 22 percent waiting for residential programs. Of the people waiting for treatment,
most wait one month or less. However, 37 percent wait more than one month to get into
treatment.").
324. United States v. Harmon, 485 F.2d 1066, 1068 (D.C. Cir. 1973). In Harmon, the D.C.
Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's determination that the individual was not appropri-
ate for DDC and ordered the individual returned for criminal sentencing. Id, The lower
court, relying on the medical examination, concluded that the defendant was not likely to be
rehabilitated at the facility that examined him, believed that no alternatives could be consid-
ered under the applicable statute, and instituted a criminal sentence based on the charge that
initially brought the defendant before the court. Id at 1067.
The D.C. Court of Appeals reversed and ruled that additional treatment alternatives not
only could be considered, but must be considered. Id. at 1068. The court stated that
"'[t]reatment,' as defined by NARA [Narcotic Addict Rehabilitation Act of 1966], encom-
passes a wide range of rehabilitative programs and services." Id.; see also In re Rice, 410
N.W.2d 907, 911 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) ("We have repeatedly criticized committing courts
which issue blanket authorizations for involuntary treatment."); In re Guardianship of Shaw,
275 N.W.2d 143, 149 (Wis. Ct. App. 1979) ("In determining whether the individual has a
primary need for protective placement, the court must consider the availability of treatment
or protective services, and order protective placement only if it is the least restrictive
alternative.").
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hearing to safeguard against an erroneous verdict.325 This may reflect a
greater concern for protecting society when drug dependency is involved.
Similarly, the California Supreme Court held that the heavy reliance on a
minimum security institution, as part of a DDC treatment program
under the direction of the Department of Corrections, with recourse for
transfer to correctional institutions for difficult security problems does
not invalidate DDC as "cruel and unusual punishment ' 326 in violation of
the Eighth Amendment.327
Furthermore, while generally recognizing that less restrictive alter-
natives must be considered, courts have upheld specific placements in-
volving involuntary inpatient treatment. In one case, a state court
remarked that other options were foreclosed if the individual refused to
cooperate with voluntary treatment and the number of alternative inpa-
tient treatment facilities with sufficient security to hold the individual
was limited.3 28 Another court noted that all previous efforts at outpa-
tient treatment had been unsuccessful, and that less restrictive alterna-
tives would not ensure that the individual would comply with the
treatment regime.329 These cases suggest that regardless of his or her
current state and needs, a potential DDC candidate who has not previ-
ously received treatment or who appears cooperative may have a better
chance of relying on the LRA doctrine to resist or modify a proposed
placement. In general, courts retain considerable discretion to choose
from a range of treatment alternatives.330
A New Jersey state court has held that LRA need not be considered
during emergency detention of a drug-abusing individual.331 This ruling
is in accord with the law regarding emergency detention as part of
325. People v. Thomas, 19 Cal. 3d 630, 634, 566 P.2d 228, 229, 139 Cal. Rptr. 594, 595
(1977).
326. In re Cruz, 62 Cal. 2d 307, 314, 398 P.2d 412, 416, 42 Cal. Rptr. 220, 224 (1965).
327. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
328. See In re Redcloud, 359 N.W.2d 710, 712 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984).
329. See In re Heurung, 446 N.W.2d 694, 696 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989).
330. See In re Rice, 410 N.W.2d 907, 911 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (under terms of DDC
statute court could select between dismissal of petition, voluntary outpatient care, informal
admission to treatment facility, appointment of guardian or conservator, release before com-
mitment and judicial commitment).
331. See L.R.C. v. Klein, 383 A.2d 764 (Super. Ct. Law Div. 1978), aff'd, 400 A.2d 496
(Super. Ct. App. Div.), cert. denied, 405 A.2d 823 (N.J. 1979). In Klein, the individual was
subject to emergency detention pursuant to a statute that permitted commitment of an individ-
ual found to be suffering from a psychosis caused by drugs or alcohol. Id. at 766. The statute
also permitted the commitment of an individual found to be suffering from a mental or nervous
illness. Id. The New Jersey Superior Court did not distinguish between these various bases for
commitment in determining that a consideration of alternatives less restrictive than institution-
alization did not need to be made as part of emergency detention. Id. at 768-69.
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CMI.332 This position may be based on a belief that under such circum-
stances, the immediate threat of danger must be dealt with swiftly and
that the detention will have limited adverse impact on the individual be-
cause of the relatively brief period of time the person will be held without
a hearing. However, commentators have criticized the failure to consider
the LRA doctrine as part of CMI emergency detention, because the per-
sons involved may pose a wide range of dangers and disabilities that
would be best addressed by a range of alternatives.333 To the extent that
society views drug dependency as posing a greater threat to society than
mental illness, and to the extent that drug dependent persons have a rela-
tively uniform series of symptoms, there is less likelihood that the LRA
doctrine would be applied to DDC emergency detention.
C. Lack of Cooperation and Ineffective Treatment
One of the avowed purposes of DDC is to provide treatment to drug
dependent individuals. Treatment will be ineffective for some individuals
because: (1) The individual will not cooperate with or participate in the
treatment program; (2) the individual is not motivated or likely to
change his or her behavior; or (3) the prescribed treatment program has
proven ineffective for the particular individual or similar individuals.
Despite such possibilities, courts have ordered commitment.334 In reach-
ing this decision, courts emphasize the need to protect the individual or
society, 335 to afford sufficient flexibility to treatment providers, 336 and to
maintain treatment for a sufficient period of time so that it may be given
an opportunity to prove effective.337
Further complicating the treatment provider's duty is that the drug
dependent individual may have a right to refuse the attempted treatment,
potentially making it more difficult to devise an effective treatment pro-
gram.338 Courts have attempted to grapple with this problem in various
332. Brakel, supra note 87, at 52.
333. See id.
334. See In re Cruz, 62 Cal. 2d 307, 315, 398 P.2d 412, 417, 42 Cal. Rptr. 220, 225 (1965);
People v. Cruz, 217 Cal. App. 3d 413, 420, 266 Cal. Rptr. 29, 33 (1990); In re Lopez, 181 Cal.
App. 3d 836, 841, 226 Cal. Rptr. 710, 713 (1986); In re Rice, 410 N.W.2d 907, 908-09 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1987); In re Guardianship of Shaw, 275 N.W.2d 143, 149 (Wis. Ct. App. 1979).
335. See Lopez, 181 Cal. App. 3d at 839, 226 Cal. Rptr. at 712; Rice, 410 N.W.2d at 911.
336. See Lopez, 181 Cal. App. 3d at 841, 226 Cal. Rptr. at 713.
337. See People v. Moore, 69 Cal. 2d 674, 685, 446 P.2d 800, 807, 72 Cal. Rptr. 800, 807
(1968), overruled on other grounds by People v. Thomas, 19 Cal. 3d 630, 566 P.2d 228, 139 Cal.
Rptr. 594 (1977); Cruz, 62 Cal. 2d at 314, 398 P.2d at 416, 42 Cal. Rptr. at 224; Lopez, 181
Cal. App. 3d at 841, 226 Cal. Rptr. at 713.
338. See Donahue v. Rhode Island Dep't of Mental Health, 632 F. Supp. 1456, 1477
(D.R.I. 1986); Rice, 410 N.W.2d at 911.
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ways. One suggestion offered by the judiciary is that the trial court
broaden the range of treatment alternatives considered, in the hope that
one of the alternatives might prove effective and acceptable.339 One
court heightened the standard to be met before an individual could be
committed in order to screen out inappropriate candidates for treat-
ment, 34° while another court argued that credits for good conduct-
decreasing the length of commitment-would encourage participation in
treatment.341 Another approach, adopted by the California Supreme
Court, was to transfer an individual who was "uncooperative with efforts
to treat [him]"-and thereby posed a continuing security problem-to a
more secure facility and house him with prison inmates.342 However, the
court did indicate that such transfers would not be appropriate if made
simply because the individual was "unresponsive to treatment in a medi-
cal sense," and noted that such individuals were routinely discharged
from the program. 343 Finally, the same court has held that an individual
who attempts to escape from a mandatory treatment program may be
governed by laws punishing escape of a prisoner committed to a state
prison.34
Interestingly, although a right to refuse treatment has received con-
siderable recognition as part of CMI, 345 there have been few CMI opin-
ions discussing whether the likely ineffectiveness of treatment should be a
basis for not committing a mentally ill individual.346 Perhaps the atten-
tion given to the likely ineffectiveness of treatment for drug dependency
at the time of commitment suggests that the intractability of treating
drug dependency is better established than for mental illness, or that tra-
ditionally there have been fewer effective treatment programs available
for such individuals. 347 However, attributing the different manners in
which CMI and DDC address an individual's refusal to accept treatment
to these factors must be questioned in light of the number of expos6s that
339. See United States v. Harmon, 485 F.2d 1066, 1068 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Rice, 410 N.W.2d
at 911-12.
340. See Donahue, 632 F. Supp. at 1477.
341. See In re Jiminez, 166 Cal. App. 3d 686, 692, 212 Cal. Rptr. 550, 555 (1985). But see
In re Martin, 125 Cal. App. 3d 896, 900, 178 Cal. Rptr. 445, 447 (1981).
342. In re Cruz, 62 Cal. 2d 307, 317, 398 P.2d 412, 418, 42 Cal. Rptr. 220, 226 (1965).
343. Id
344. See In re De La 0, 59 Cal. 2d 128, 143-44, 378 P.2d 793, 803, 28 Cal. Rptr. 489, 499,
cert. denied, 374 U.S. 856 (1963).
345. See generally 2 PERLIN, supra note 87, §§ 5.01-.69, at 215-438 (discussing historical
background, constitutional implications and judicial development of right to refuse treatment
cases).
346. 1 id at 392.
347. See supra note 323.
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have been generated regarding the avowed institutional neglect of the
mentally ill348 and the attention given to the chronicity of mental illness
for some individuals.34 9 Another explanation may be that drug depen-
dent individuals are less disabled in the sense that they are more able to
participate in or resist decisions made by others regarding their treat-
ment. As a result, drug dependent individuals, or counsel arguing on
their behalf, may be more likely than a mentally ill individual to resist a
particular program, assert a need for a more individualized treatment
program or object to institutional care. Regardless of which of these ra-
tionales adequately explains the difference between CMI and DDC, the
willingness of the courts to impose DDC again suggests that courts real-
ize the importance of these proceedings for protecting the individual or
society, and that they are unwilling to be swayed by a lack of cooperation
or motivation on the part of the DDC candidate.
D. Maximum Periods of Treatment
The maximum period for which a drug dependent person can be
committed for treatment varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and is
usually determined by statute.35 0 The California statute establishes a
twelve-month limit for non-criminals, and a sixteen-month limit for
those committed pursuant to any other statutory section, including those
who have been convicted of a crime.35' If medical personnel at a treat-
ment facility feel that the individual needs to continue treatment, the
person may be recommitted for additional periods.352 Notably, over the
past two decades-since the program was established in California-the
period for treatment has gradually been reduced from a minimum of
three-and-one-half years and a maximum of ten years for individuals
348. For a general discussion of the evolution of the right to treatment as it applies to the
mentally disabled, see 2 PERLIN, supra note 87, § 4.47, at 214.
349. See, eg., H. Richard Lamb, Community Treatment for the Chronically Mentally Ill,
42(2) Hosp. & COMMUNrrY PSYCHIATRY 117 (1991); L.L. Bachrach, The Chronic Patient:
Planning High-Quality Services, 42(3) Hosp. & COMMUNrrY PSYCHIATRY 268 (1991).
350. See Garcia & Keilitz, supra note 21, at 418-19. Initial commitment periods range
from thirty days to three years. Id at 419. Historically, emphasis has been given to the need
to maintain an individual on a drug treatment program for a period extending beyond the
cessation of withdrawal symptoms. See Aronowitz, supra note 16, at 407.
351. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 3201(a)-(b) (West 1984). The length of confinement is
further limited in the case of a criminal defendant who has been committed, in lieu of sentenc-
ing, to a term equal to the determinate sentence for the underlying offense, id. § 3201(c),
although it has been ruled that a misdemeanant may be confined longer than the maximum
time he or she would otherwise be required to serve in jail, up to a maximum of 16 months, see
In re Jiminez, 166 Cal. App. 3d 686, 212 Cal. Rptr. 550 (1985).
352. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 3201(c) (West 1984).
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committed involuntarily,353 to the current maximum of sixteen
months.35 4
Under the federal DDC act, NARA, a person committed for the
treatment of his or her drug dependency may be detained up to six
months.355 At the time of release, the person is to appear in court. After
considering the recommendations of the Surgeon General, the court may
place the individual under the care and custody of the Surgeon General
for the next three years for treatment and supervision in a posthospital-
ization program.3 5 6 If during this three-year period the individual fails to
comply with the posthospitalization program, or is determined by the
Surgeon General to again be using narcotic drugs, the individual may be
returned to the committing court, which may recommit the individual
for another six-month period.35 7
Although the maximum length of treatment is typically established
by statute, medical personnel usually retain the ability to discharge an
individual prior to the end of this period.35 ' Generally, this decision can
be based on a conclusion that involuntary confinement is no longer nec-
essary because the individual is cured, the treatment can be continued in
a non-institutional setting or further treatment is not likely to be
effective.
359
Few judicial opinions have decided the appropriateness of statutory
limits on the length of DDC or on how such limits are affected by treat-
ment personnel's exercise of their discretion to release. In its initial deci-
sion on these matters, the California Supreme Court upheld the
imposition of standard minimum and maximum lengths of stay.3 1" It
was argued that providing standard lengths of stay was not related to the
treatment or rehabilitation of the drug dependent person as a sick per-
son.36 1 Instead, the argument continued, it showed legislative intent to
imprison a drug dependent person as a criminal, and thus provided crim-
353. See Aronowitz, supra note 16, at 409. Those individuals who were committed at their
own request could only be committed for a maximum of 30 months. Id. at 409 n.30.
354. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 3201(a).
355. 42 U.S.C. § 3416 (1988).
356. Id § 3417(a) (1988).
357. Id § 3417(b) (1988).
358. See, e.g., id. § 3416 ("[S]uch patient may be released from confinement by the Surgeon
General at any time prior to the expiration of such six-month period if the Surgeon General
determines that the patient has been cured of his drug addiction and rehabilitated, or that his
continued confinement is no longer necessary or desirable.").
359. See, e.g., id.
360. See In re De La 0, 59 Cal. 2d 128, 378 P.2d 793, 28 Cal. Rptr. 489, cert. denied, 374
U.S. 856 (1963).
361. Id. at 140, 378 P.2d at 801, 28 Cal. Rptr. at 497.
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inal penalties for an illness (narcotics addiction) in violation of the Cruel
and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment. 62 The
court rejected the challenge to a six-month minimum length of stay by
asserting that "there is medical evidence that the addict will benefit from
a minimum period of confinement and control during which he is de-
prived of narcotics, thus permitting the withdrawal symptoms to run
their course and alleviate at least his physiological dependence on
drugs. '3 63 In determining that a six-month minimum stay was reason-
able, the court concluded that setting the precise length of this period
was largely up to the legislature because it must be "allowed some leeway
in translating into exact figures such medically imprecise concepts as the
minimum beneficial term of confinement." 316 Similarly, the court de-
cided that a five-year maximum length of stay was not an impermissible
penal sanction because earlier discharge was available and confinement
was actually for an indeterminate period, similar to the indeterminate
commitments provided for mentally ill persons.365 Finally, the court
ruled that it was not necessary to establish a specific judicial proceeding
for challenges to a staff decision on when "early discharge" should oc-
cur.3 66 Instead, the court concluded that the general right to a writ of
habeas corpus, which was also available to committed mentally ill indi-
viduals, would satisfy this need.3 67
The judiciary has given considerable attention to whether individu-
als who are committed in lieu of criminal sentencing may have their com-
mitment reduced for good behavior.368 Courts have stated that such an
individual "cannot be required to spend longer in confinement than he or
362. This argument was premised upon the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Robinson v.
California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962), in which a statute making it a criminal offense to "be addicted
to the use of narcotics" was ruled unconstitutional. Id at 667. But see supra note 17.
363. De La 0, 59 Cal. 2d at 140, 378 P.2d at 801, 28 Cal. Rptr. at 497.
364. Id at 141, 378 P.2d at 801, 28 Cal. Rptr. at 497.
365. Id The court also upheld the imposition of a longer maximum for a "felon-addict"
than for a "misdemeanant-addict." !L at 143, 378 P.2d at 803, 28 Cal. Rptr. at 499.
366. See id. at 141-42, 378 P.2d at 802, 28 Cal. Rptr. at 498.
367. I d; see also In re Goldie, 35 Cal. App. 341, 169 P. 925 (1917) (concluding that com-
mitted narcotics addict with no remedy under applicable state law had right to writ of habeas
corpus).
368. See In re Mabie, 159 Cal. App. 3d 301, 305-06, 308, 205 Cal. Rptr. 528, 530, 532
(1984); People v. Hankins, 137 Cal. App. 3d 694, 699, 187 Cal. Rptr. 210, 213 (1982); In re
Martin, 125 Cal. App. 3d 896, 178 Cal. Rptr. 445 (1981). Litigation also has addressed
whether an individual who is initially civilly committed for treatment in lieu of sentencing for
a criminal offense, but is subsequently found inappropriate for treatment and returned to the
court for sentencing on the criminal offense, should have the length of the sentence reduced to
reflect the time spent in treatment. See In re Jiminez, 166 Cal. App. 3d 686, 691, 212 Cal.
Rptr. 550, 554 (1985).
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she could have served on the underlying felony with full credit for behav-
ior and participation.369
E. Outpatient Treatment and Aftercare Status
Although hospitalization is typically part of the treatment program
for most DDC candidates, it also may be possible to place the individual
in a range of outpatient settings, either subsequent to or in place of initial
hospitalization?70 Even after discharge from an inpatient or outpatient
setting, an individual may be required to meet certain conditions for dis-
charge or face return to his or her original outpatient placement.371
Passing a drug test may be one such condition.372 Attaching conditions
has been justified because they enable the staff to detect violations and to
deter future drug abuse.3 73 Similar rationales have been given for up-
holding "'surprise' testing program[s]. 374
Generally, courts have upheld-and often encouraged-the use of
outpatient placements as a means to gauge progressively the individual's
readiness to return to the community.375 Courts have concomitantly up-
held the ability to rescind outpatient placements upon a conclusion that
369. Martin, 125 Cal. App. 3d at 900, 178 Cal. Rptr. at 447. A subsequent United States
Supreme Court decision addressing the commitment of insanity acquittees held that the ac-
quittee's hypothetical maximum sentence does not provide the constitutional limit for his or
her commitment. Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354 (1983).
370. See, e-g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 397.021(7) (West 1992); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 253B.09(1) (West 1992). In addition, outpatient placement for purposes of treating drug
abuse may be ordered by a court in lieu of criminal conviction or sentencing. See, e.g., State v.
D'Ambrosio, 491 A.2d 805, 807 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1985).
371. See, eg., In re De La 0, 59 Cal. 2d 128, 144-45, 378 P.2d 793, 803, 28 Cal. Rptr. 489,
499, cert. denied, 374 U.S. 856 (1963). The presence of these parole rules did not convert
DDC into a penal sanction in violation of the Eighth Amendment under Robinson v. Califor-
nia, 370 U.S. 660 (1962). The California Supreme Court explained that "[t]hese rules appear
to be designed to meet the particular needs of an addict in the later stages of the process of
rehabilitation rather than to evidence a legislative intent that the prior confinement constitute
a penal sanction." De La 0, 59 Cal. 2d at 145, 378 P.2d at 804, 28 Cal. Rptr. at 500; see also
In re Marks, 71 Cal. 2d 31, 38, 453 P.2d 441, 446, 77 Cal. Rptr. 1, 6 (1969) (holding that
agency responsible for supervising outpatient release is authorized to impose mandatory drug
testing "without probable cause"); In re Galusha, 372 N.W.2d 843, 846 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985)
("Patients subject to commitment may be provisionally discharged subject to conditions or
restrictions."). A need for these restrictions has long been recognized by commentators on
DDC. See Aronowitz, supra note 16, at 407.
372. See Marks, 71 Cal. 2d at 41, 453 P.2d at 448, 77 Cal. Rptr. at 8. In addition, the type
of test to be utilized has been left to the discretion of the testing agency. Id. at 42, 453 P.2d at
449, 77 Cal. Rptr. at 8.
373. Id. at 39, 453 P.2d at 447, 77 Cal. Rptr. at 7.
374. Id.
375. See, eg., In re Rice, 410 N.W.2d 907, 912 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987).
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the individual needs a more restrictive and secure placement376 or that
society needs protection.377 Indeed, one court ruled that an individual
found to be in violation of his or her conditions of discharge can be re-
committed for a longer period of time than a prison inmate can be con-
fined pursuant to a revocation of parole.3 78 The court's rationale was
that the two procedures served different purposes.379 The court viewed
drug abuse as an illness and stated that unless the individual is cured of
his or her addiction, the likelihood of recidivism or further drug related
crime remains.380 Therefore, release was tied to rehabilitation, and the
goal of returning the individual to treatment was to cure, not to pun-
ish.381 The court asserted that treatment providers must be afforded flex-
ibility to cure an individual-a flexibility that the twelve-month
maximum associated with parole violations could not provide.38 2
There is general agreement that due process protections should gov-
ern the decision to revoke aftercare status.383 However, courts have been
split on the degree of due process protection that must be afforded. In a
New York case, it was ruled that a drug dependent individual must re-
ceive the same protections as would be received by a prison inmate hav-
ing his or her parole revoked.384 This court found that the return to
inpatient status was a "grievous... loss of liberty. 385 An erroneous
revocation had the potential of impeding the rehabilitative goal of re-
turning the individual to a normal, productive life, and providing addi-
tional procedural protections would have a beneficial therapeutic effect
by impressing on the individual that he or she was receiving fair, nonar-
bitrary treatment.386 To meet due process requirements, the court re-
quired that a relatively streamlined preliminary inquiry be held shortly
after detention, and that a more comprehensive final revocation hearing
be conducted after the individual was returned to the facility where he or
she was initially placed.387 In addition, the court set forth, in considera-
376. See id at 911-12.
377. See Marks, 71 Cal. 2d at 39, 453 P.2d at 447, 77 Cal. Rptr. at 7.
378. See In re Lopez, 181 Cal. App. 3d 836, 840-41, 226 Cal. Rptr. 710, 713 (1986).
379. Id. at 839, 226 Cal. Rptr. at 712.
380. Id at 839-40, 226 Cal. Rptr. at 712-13.
381. Id
382. Id. at 841, 226 Cal. Rptr. at 713.
383. See, eg., In re Bye, 12 Cal. 3d 96, 102, 524 P.2d 854, 858, 115 Cal. Rptr. 382, 386
(1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 996 (1975); Ball v. Jones, 351 N.Y.S.2d 199 (App. Div. 1974),
aff'd sub norm Pannell v. Jones, 329 N.E.2d 159 (N.Y. 1975).
384. See Ball, 351 N.Y.S.2d at 204.
385. Id.
386. Id at 205.
387. Id at 205-06.
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ble detail, the procedures that were to accompany both of these hear-
ings.318 The court did recognize that these hearings were not limited to a
mere factual resolution of whether the individual had violated the condi-
tions for discharge, but required administrative officials to predict the
ability of the individual to continue aftercare without reverting to drug
abuse.389
However, it was this latter element combined with a perceived need
to provide administrative officials sufficient flexibility in reviewing such
matters that led the California Supreme Court to lessen considerably the
required procedures.390 The court concluded that the purpose and prac-
tice of a DDC program are considerably different than those of a parole
system.391 The court noted that the DDC program is designed to speed
the return of these individuals to the community so that they can adapt
to the environment in which they must eventually function.392 As a re-
suit, many releases will be premature. However, "an unsuccessful pre-
mature release is [assumed to be] preferable to an unnecessarily delayed
one" 393 and should be considered " 'as a step in the total process of reha-
388. The limited function of the preliminary inquiry was "'to determine whether there
[was] probable cause or reasonable ground to believe'" that the violation occurred. Id. at 206
(quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 485 (1971)). The preliminary inquiry "'must be
conducted at or reasonably near the place of the alleged' aftercare 'violation... as promptly as
convenient... while information was fresh and sources were available,"' with notice of the
hearing and the alleged violations given to the individual, who could appear on his or her own
behalf, bringing documents or witnesses. Id. (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 485
(1971)). Adverse witnesses must be available for questioning, and a written decision must be
issued. Id However, the preliminary inquiry could be conducted by a single narcotic after-
care officer as long as the officer had not been "responsible for reporting aftercare violations
and recommending revocation or been directly involved in the case in any other way." Id.
The availability of counsel was to be decided on a case-by-case basis, unless the individual
requested counsel or appeared to be incapable of speaking effectively for him or herself. Id. at
207. The final revocation hearing was to include, in addition to a right to counsel:
(1) written notice of the claimed delinquency violations; (2) disclosure of the evi-
dence against the alleged violator; (3) an opportunity to be heard and to present
witnesses; (4) the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses (unless...
good cause for denying such confrontation is specifically found); (5) a neutral and
detached hearing body; and (6) a written statement of the factfinder's determination,
including a statement of the rationale when revocation is ordered.
Id at 204-05.
389. Id at 205.
390. See In re Bye, 12 Cal. 3d 96, 103, 524 P.2d 854, 859, 115 Cal. Rptr. 382, 387 (1974)
('[The individual's interest in insuring that the revocation of his right to remain at liberty be
for cause must be balanced against the ... need to... rehabilitat[e] addicts with a minimum of
interference and a maximum of speed."), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 996 (1975).
391. Id.
392. Id at 104, 524 P.2d at 859, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 387.
393. Id.
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bilitation.' ",9' At the same time, administrative officials must be able to
"act promptly upon evidence of the appearance of distress signals" that
indicate a reversion to drug abuse by an addict who has failed as an out-
patient.3 9 5 Without the power to intervene quickly, the ultimate timeta-
ble for recovery may be severely delayed. 96 Furthermore, the court
noted that because such individuals are recovering from an "illness," the
officials making these decisions will be trained in the field and actually
engaged in the treatment. Therefore, the decisions are "less subject to
objective scrutiny by a lay hearing officer."3 97 The court concluded that
these rationales eliminated the need for a preliminary hearing, which
would delay the individual's return to treatment. Due process requires
only that a single revocation hearing be held as soon as reasonably possi-
ble upon the outpatient's prompt return to the inpatient facility.
398
F. The Right to and Nature of Treatment
In upholding the use of DDC, courts frequently emphasize the treat-
ment that is to be provided to the individual during the course of confine-
ment.399 A majority of states have established a statutory right to
treatment for persons with a mental disability who are civilly commit-
ted.' Many DDC statutes similarly establish such rights." 1
While there has been considerable litigation devoted to resolving
whether or not individuals with a mental disability who are civilly com-
mitted have a right to treatment or habilitation, either constitutional or
394. Id. (quoting In re Marks, 71 Cal. 2d 31, 49, 453 P.2d 441, 454, 77 Cal. Rptr. 1, 14
(1969)).
395. Id. at 105, 524 P.2d at 860, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 388.
396. Id.
397. Id. at 107, 524 P.2d at 861, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 389.
398. Id. at 108-09, 524 P.2d at 867, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 390. The due process rights afforded
at this hearing are virtually identical to those recognized in Ball v. Jones, 351 N.Y.S.2d 199
(App. Div. 1974), aff'd sub nom. Pannell v. Jones, 329 N.E.2d 159 (N.Y. 1975), as being
required as part of its final revocation hearing. See supra note 388.
399. See, e.g., People v. Moore, 69 Cal. 2d 674, 684-85, 446 P.2d 800, 807, 72 Cal. Rptr.
800, 807 (1968), overruled on other grounds by People v. Thomas, 19 Cal. 3d 630, 566 P.2d
228, 139 Cal. Rptr. 594 (1977); In re De La 0, 59 Cal. 2d 128, 149-50, 378 P.2d 793, 807, 28
Cal. Rptr. 489, 503, cert. denied, 374 U.S. 856 (1963); In re Heurung, 446 N.W.2d 694, 696
(Minn. Ct. App. 1989); People ex rel Blunt v. Narcotic Addiction Control Comm'n, 295
N.Y.S.2d 276, 281 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 296 N.Y.S.2d 533 (App. Div. 1968), aff'd, 248 N.E.2d
918 (N.Y. 1969).
400. REISNER & SLOBOGIN, supra note 243, at 977. For tables summarizing the statutory
treatment rights of the mentally disabled and statutory restrictions on the treatment of men-
tally disabled individuals who have been institutionalized, see Barbara A. Weiner, Treatment
Rights, in THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW, supra note 87, at 327, 352-67.
401. See, eg., IOWA CODE ANN. § 125.92 (West 1987); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-5221
(1990); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122C-57(c) (1989).
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statutory in nature, 402 the question has not received much attention in
the context of DDC. The discussion of a right to treatment has been
raised only briefly, and usually as background for other issues, such as
the right to refuse treatment or the criteria for commitment.' 3
Furthermore, the nature of the treatment and care to be provided
has been little discussed. A New York court cited misunderstandings by
a DDC candidate of the treatment to be afforded as a rationale for
heightened procedural protections.' Other cases have denied com-
plaints about the treatment provided, without establishing what treat-
ment is required." 5 Two California Supreme Court decisions from the
1960s indicate the minimum level of treatment that must be offered as
part of a DDC program.' A recent settlement of a Massachusetts law-
suit suggests what may be some of the current treatment goals associated
with DDC.
4 °7
A 1963 California Supreme Court opinion upheld the conditions of
confinement and apparently noted with approval that the DDC residents
were separated from prisoners at the facility." 8 However, in a 1965
opinion, the same court ruled that it was constitutionally permissible to
house drug dependent individuals with inmates of the prison facility, par-
ticularly if drug dependent individuals were offered the same treatment
as provided at other facilities housing drug dependent individuals. 4° 9
Among the treatments listed as universally available were: "qualified
counseling on a weekly basis in groups of less than ten men, plus individ-
ual counseling when indicated; academic and vocational training, plus
regular work assignments; recreational and religious facilities; and pei-
402. See generally 2 PERLIN, supra note 87, §§ 4.01-.47, at 1-214 (discussing issues raised in
litigating mental disability claims); Weiner, supra note 400, at 334-40 (reviewing history of
rights to treatment and habilitation in context of mentally disabled or ill and noting that ma-
jority of states now statutorily recognize right to treatment and that 25 states recognize right
to habilitation).
403. See Marshall v. Parker, 470 F.2d 34, 38 n.7 (9th Cir. 1972), aff'd, 414 U.S. 417 (1974);
In re Rice, 410 N.W.2d 907, 911 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987).
404. See People ex rel Berdaguer v. Morrow, 302 N.Y.S.2d 628, 633 (Sup. Ct. 1969).
405. See Jarrell v. Chemical Dependency Unit, 791 F.2d 373, 374 n.1 (5th Cir. 1986); Peo-
ple ex reL Blunt v. Narcotic Addiction Control Comm'n, 295 N.Y.S.2d 276, 282 (Sup. Ct.),
aff'd, 296 N.Y.S.2d 533 (App. Div. 1968), aff'd, 248 N.E.2d 918 (N.Y. 1969).
406. See In re Cruz, 62 Cal. 2d 307, 398 P.2d 412, 42 Cal. Rptr. 220 (1965); In re De La O,
59 Cal. 2d 128, 378 P.2d 793, 28 Cal. Rptr. 489, cert. denied, 374 U.S. 856 (1963).
407. See Hinckley v. Fair, No. 88-064 (Mass. Trial Ct. Nov. 30, 1990), reported in Case Law
Developments--Civil Commitment, 15 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 124 (1991).
408. See De La 0, 59 Cal. 2d at 148, 378 P.2d at 806, 28 Cal. Rptr. at 502; see also Blunt,
295 N.Y.S.2d at 281 (expressing concern about failure to provide separate housing facilities for
drug dependent individuals).
409. See Cruz, 62 Cal. 2d at 316, 398 P.2d at 417, 42 Cal. Rptr. at 225.
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odical progress evaluations with a view to [ ]transfer... or direct release
to out-patient status. '410 In general, personalized counseling provided
by specially trained staff and supplemented by a range of programs ap-
pears to enjoy the support of the courts.4 11
In a recent settlement that concluded a challenge to the treatment of
women with substance abuse problems in Massachusetts, the parties
agreed on the importance of developing community treatment alterna-
tives to institutional care.4 12 In developing these alternatives, the State
agreed to contract for detoxification beds in free-standing community
substance abuse programs, to develop referral processes and responses,
and to expedite transfer to community programs. 413 In addition, the set-
tlement emphasized that an individual's decision to enter treatment was
often critical to success, that voluntary treatment should be encouraged
and that involuntary civil commitment should only be used where volun-
tary placement has been refused and there is a "clear and present danger
to the individual or others as a result of chronic substance abuse.
' 414
Furthermore, if an individual is civilly committed after completing a de-
toxification and assessment period, but is not ready or willing to address
his or her substance abuse problem, the individual should be allowed to
leave the facility if it is determined that discharge is appropriate and the
individual no longer poses a danger to him or herself or others.41 5
This general lack of litigation may be a function of the relative infre-
quency with which DDC is employed. 416 Alternatively, it may reflect a
routine deferral to the professional judgment of treatment providers.417
In addition, some courts have explicitly noted that DDC has not been
established solely to provide treatment to drug dependent persons, but
410. Id., 398 P.2d at 417-18, 42 Cal. Rptr. at 225-26. Similar treatment was described as
provided in the DDC programs referred to in De La 0, 59 Cal. 2d at 148, 378 P.2d at 806, 28
Cal. Rptr. at 502.
411. See Cruz, 62 Cal. 2d at 316, 398 P.2d at 417, 42 Cal. Rptr. at 225.
412. See Hinckley v. Fair, No. 88-064 (Mass. Trial Ct. Nov. 30, 1990), reported in Case Law
Developments-Civil Commitment, supra note 407, at 124.
413. Id.
414. Id.
415. Id.
416. See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
417. See, e.g., People v. Moore, 69 Cal. 2d 674, 685, 446 P.2d 800, 807, 72 Cal. Rptr. 800,
807 (1968), overruled on other grounds by People v. Thomas, 19 Cal. 3d 630, 566 P.2d 228, 139
Cal. Rptr. 594 (1977); People ex reL Blunt v. Narcotics Addiction Control Comm'n, 295
N.Y.S.2d 276, 281-82 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 296 N.Y.S.2d 533 (App. Div. 1968), aff'd, 248 N.E.2d
918 (N.Y. 1969); see also Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 321-23 (1982) (adopting profes-
sional judgment rule in assessing treatment provided).
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also to control and confine such individuals.41 All of these factors may
explain why courts have paid considerably more attention to the proce-
dures that result in a drug dependent person being involuntarily placed
within a treatment facility, than to the care that is actually provided
there. It may be that the courts are willing to consider treatment issues
only if there is virtually a total absence of treatment.419
G. The Lack of Programs
One of the problems faced by treatment providers attempting to re-
spond to drug dependent persons is the lack of resources needed to pro-
vide adequate and effective treatment programs.420 This is a concern of
government entities and agencies. Although it has been held that there is
no fundamental constitutional right to rehabilitation for drug depen-
dency at public expense,4 21 there has been a general recognition of a right
to at least some form of treatment following DDC.422
Failure to comply with legislation mandating the use of DDC as an
alternative to criminal prosecution has been used to challenge criminal
convictions for public intoxication. For example, a California statute
stipulates that a police officer arresting a person who is drunk in public
must place the person in civil protective custody if "reasonably able to do
so" and that the person so detained shall not be subject to criminal prose-
cution.423 In People v. Ambellas,424 an individual, convicted of misde-
meanor public drunkenness, appealed his conviction by arguing that the
police officer should have taken him to a detoxification center rather than
placing him under arrest.4 25 The court held that the appellant was re-
quired to initially raise the issue and that the appellant also bore the
ultimate burden of proof.426 In light of the statute's mandatory language
and benign purpose, however, which is "to provide medical instead of
418. See, e.g., People v. Thomas, 19 Cal. 3d 630, 638-39, 566 P.2d 228, 232-33, 139 Cal.
Rptr. 594, 598-99 (1977).
419. See Blunt, 295 N.Y.S.2d at 281. Historically, criticisms of DDC focused on the lack of
meaningful treatment provided to civilly committed drug dependent persons. See Aronowitz,
supra note 16, at 406.
420. See supra note 324; see also Need for Drug Abuse Treatment Exceeds Availability,
supra note 323, at 1 ("Yet another survey has found that there is not enough drug abuse
treatment.").
421. See Marshall v. Parker, 470 F.2d 34, 38 (9th Cir. 1972), aff'd, 414 U.S. 417 (1974).
422. See supra notes 399-419 and accompanying text.
423. CAL. PENAL CODE § 647(ff) (West 1988 & Supp. 1992).
424. 85 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 24, 149 Cal. Rptr. 680 (1978).
425. Id. at 30, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 683.
426. Id. at 33, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 685.
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penal treatment for one drunk in public,"'427 the court held that once the
defense was raised, the burden of producing evidence establishing the
officer's reasonable inability to place the individual in a detoxification
center fell on the state.428 The court noted the experimental nature of
civil protective custody for inebriates and the legislature's desire to en-
courage establishment of detoxification facilities by not dictating mini-
mum bed capacities, which might discourage county participation due to
financial restraints.42 9 It then went on to list factors that could be con-
sidered in determining an officer's reasonable ability to place an individ-
ual. These included the lack of available beds at the facility,43 the
likelihood the facility would not accept the individual because of the indi-
vidual's attitude,4' the distance, time and cost involved in transporting
the individual to an alternative facility that would or could accept the
individual and the manpower available for such transport.432 Ultimately,
the conviction was overturned not because there was a lack of facility
space or programs for the appellant, but because the state failed to pro-
duce evidence at trial showing that the officer was not reasonably able to
place him in a detoxification center at the time of his arrest.4 33
Challenging an order for DDC also has been based upon the condi-
tions and lack of resources at the treatment facilities to which the drug
dependent person is committed. One New York court, reviewing the
conditions at a drug treatment program (located within a correctional
institute) for convicted addicts committed to custody for an indefinite
period, found that it "does not offer to the prisoners any routine psychi-
atric or psychological treatment," and that "50% of the addicts have not
been motivated to accept help" and do not receive "treatment or ther-
apy."'434 Nevertheless, the court held that the program was not "totally
without merit, '435 and noted, "[t]he experimental nature of this program
427. IA at 32, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 684.
428. Id. at 34, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 685.
429. Id. at 31, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 683.
430. I& at 38, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 688. The court noted that there was only one detoxification
center in Los Angeles County with 20 beds, and that in 1975 alone there had been 80,240
arrests for public intoxication, drug use or a combination of the two. Id at 38-39, 149 Cal.
Rptr. at 688.
431. Id. at 41, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 690.
432. Id. at 37, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 687-88.
433. Id. at 42, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 691.
434. People ex reL Blunt v. Narcotic Addiction Control Comm'n, 295 N.Y.S.2d 276, 281
(Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 296 N.Y.S.2d 533 (App. Div. 1968), aff'd, 248 N.E.2d 918 (N.Y. 1969).
435. Id.
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is obvious, and trial and error must be permitted if any effective and
efficient program is to be evolved.1
4 36
The courts appear to recognize that attempting to treat and rehabili-
tate drug dependent persons is a difficult and uncertain task that poten-
tially requires a huge outlay of resources that society may not be willing
or able to devote to the problem.4 37 Nevertheless, the New York court,
in noting the problems present at the treating facility, stated that despite
the lack of resources, drug dependent persons could not be ignored once
placed in custody.438 Citing language from another court, it expressed its
concern that DDC may "'become a mere vehicle for warehousing the
obnoxious and antisocial elements of society.' "439
H. Interactions Between Judicial and Treatment Personnel
The interaction and cooperation between the judiciary and drug
treatment personnel is an important component of DDC. The court, as
an impartial tribunal, is generally charged with placing a drug dependent
person in the least restrictive treatment program that will meet the pa-
tient's treatment needs.' 0 At the same time, treatment personnel gener-
ally provide input to the court regarding whether the DDC candidate
meets the criteria for commitment and, if so, what placement is most
appropriate. 44 1 Furthermore, treatment personnel are responsible for
carrying out a court's commitment order and providing the necessary
treatment. 4 2 There are, however, numerous aspects of the interaction
between the judiciary and treatment personnel where the responsibilities
are not clearly defined, and there is potential for considerable friction and
confusion resulting from gaps and overlaps between the two.
For example, while courts have been assigned the responsibility for
determining the least restrictive alternative in CMI, mental health au-
thorities have criticized this assignment. Mental health authorities argue
that such decisions involve an inherent medical component and that
when the courts make medical decisions they go beyond the scope of
their authority and expertise, intruding upon that of the medical profes-
sion."' However, ascertaining the LRA in DDC may raise issues that
436. Id. at 282.
437. See supra note 420.
438. Blunt, 295 N.Y.S.2d at 282.
439. Id (quoting Sas v. Maryland, 334 F.2d 506, 516 (4th Cir. 1964)).
440. See supra notes 320-33 and accompanying text.
441. See supra notes 116-44, 151-63 and accompanying text.
442. See supra notes 399-419 and accompanying text.
443. See Rita Ransohoff et al., Measuring Restrictiveness of Psychiatric Care, 33 Hosp. &
COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 361, 362 (1982).
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are uniquely suited to a judicial determination, such as balancing the
state's interest in treating drug dependent persons against the individual's
interests in being free of unnecessary intrusions upon their freedom and
their qualified right to refuse treatment.444 One resolution of this poten-
tial conflict has been posed by the American Psychiatric Association,
which has stated that "the definition of treatment and the appraisal of its
adequacy are matters for medical determination. Final authority with
respect to interpreting the law on the subject rests with the courts."" 5
Another aspect of DDC that involves a potential conflict between
the responsibilities of the medical and judicial systems concerns the im-
plementation of emergency detention. For example, challenges have
been lodged that it is inappropriate for medical authorities to single-
handedly decide whether an individual is in need of emergency involun-
tary hospitalization. This, the argument continues, is because the con-
servative nature of such medical authorities will inevitably lead to a
decision to detain the individual and will overlook the need to protect the
liberty interests of the individual, a consideration the courts with their
broader perspective are more likely to take into account.446 In response,
however, one court has ruled that "the remedy lies in... enforcement of
the requirement for the chief executive of the admitting institution to
properly exercise the discretion mandated by the statute," and that the
DDC statute should not be declared unconstitutional just because it was
implemented erroneously.' 7
Although the courts remain responsible for ordering an individual
into treatment on a long-term basis, the medical personnel at the treat-
ment facility still retain a general responsibility for determining whether
the person continues to be in need of treatment. When the medical per-
sonnel at a treatment facility determine that an individual is not amena-
ble to treatment, the court may be asked to determine what other
treatment, if any, may be more appropriate for the individual." 8 Alter-
natively, a conflict between the judiciary and treatment staff may occur
when the habilitation goals set by the court have been attained or release
is ordered because of a procedural flaw in the commitment process, yet
444. See, e.g., In re Rice, 410 N.W.2d 907 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987).
445. Council of the American Psychiatric Association, Official Action: Position Statement
on the Adequacy of Treatment, 123 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1458 (1967).
446. See, e.g., L.R.C. v. Klein, 383 A.2d 764, 767 (Super. Ct. Law Div. 1978), aff'd, 400
A.2d 496 (Super. Ct. App. Div.), cert denied, 405 A.2d 823 (N.J. 1979).
447. Id. at 768.
448. See id.
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the individual's detention in a treatment facility is recommended by the
treatment personnel.449
The issue of whether the courts should extend periodic review to the
treatment of drug dependent individuals is a subject that has been dis-
cussed, but which is still unsettled.450 The discretion to determine when
a patient has successfully completed treatment may arguably belong to
either the personnel who treat the patient, or to the court as a neutral
arbitrator of the divergent interests involved in DDC. One court faced
with the commitment of an alcoholic for extended treatment refused to
decide whether periodic court examinations of the individual's treatment
status were necessary.45' The court did note that because a commitment
cannot constitutionally continue after the basis for the commitment has
ended, "the state should therefore be required to periodically prove the
need for continued commitment. '452
One commentator has stated that "the right to periodic review is
now firmly entrenched in involuntary civil commitment law."145 3 For ex-
ample, the existence of this right was recognized in Fasulo v. Arafeh,45 a a
case that also held that the burden of proof at the periodic review was to
be the same as that carried at the initial hearing that resulted in the com-
mitment of the individual.455 The right to such periodic review has not
been raised with regard to DDC proceedings. Any distinction that might
be made would probably center on perceived differences in the need to
protect society, or on a belief that DDC is not discontinued even when its
treatment goals are no longer being furthered. However, issues regarding
periodic review may become less important if the trend toward limiting
the length of commitment continues.45 6
449. See, eg., Thompson v. Morrow, 293 N.Y.S.2d 974, 979 (Sup. Ct. 1968); cf Weiner,
supra note 220, at 268 ("The failure of some states to provide for regular or any monitoring of
the disabled's condition is inconsistent with the principle of assuring that the mentally disabled
individual be treated in the least restrictive setting or manner necessary to accomplish the
treatment or habilitation goals established for him.").
450. See, eg., In re Guardianship of Shaw, 275 N.W.2d 143 (Wis. Ct. App. 1979).
451. Id. at 153.
452. Id The court also noted the State's contention that periodic review by the court was
unnecessary because adequate safeguards existed-the agency responsible for placement was
required to review the patient's status, and the agency, guardian or ward could petition the
court for the release of the patient and a hearing would have to be granted if such hearing had
not been held within six months. Id
453. 1 PERLIN, supra note 87, § 3.60, at 385.
454. 378 A.2d 553, 556 (Conn. 1977).
455. Id at 556-57.
456. See supra notes 350-69 and accompanying text. See generally Weiner, supra note 220,
at 268 (noting that under most state statutes, commitment orders are of limited duration so
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VI. CONCLUSION
Generally, like other segments of society, courts appear uncertain as
to the proper means for assisting drug dependent persons and protecting
others from their untoward behavior. While they recognize legislative
mandates to treat such individuals via DDC, they are also cognizant of
the potential infringement of protected liberties that are involved. They
vacillate between espousing an approach that safeguards a person as-
serted to be drug dependent from an inappropriate or unneeded imposi-
tion of DDC, and supporting an informal, streamlined system that
quickly and effectively assists the drug dependent person.
The balancing of these two interests, which is itself somewhat varia-
ble by necessity, appears to be complicated further by a recurring percep-
tion or concern that the treatment provided is insufficient or ineffective.
The intransigence of drug dependency and the difficulties associated with
treating it have received increased recognition by the judiciary, and this
recognition has resulted in a further divergence of opinion among review-
ing courts. Some judges appear to view the difficulties of treatment as a
rationale for emphasizing the custodial aspects of DDC and their respon-
sibility to protect the drug dependent person and society from the dan-
gers associated with drug dependency. In turn, these difficulties also
provide a basis for focusing on removing the individual from society,
with treatment being a secondary or irrelevant element. Other judges
conclude that the difficulties in treating drug dependency justify afford-
ing treatment providers with considerable discretion, flexibility and au-
thority in their attempts to treat individuals as part of DDC. A final
group of judges argues that treatment difficulties limit the effectiveness
and rationale for DDC in general, and thus form the basis for heightened
procedural and substantive protections to limit its use or for requiring
treatment providers to explore a wide range of treatment alternatives.
At the same time, despite an apparent uncertainty as to the proper
approach for analyzing DDC-related issues, courts have almost uni-
formly refused to issue broad-ranging condemnations of DDC. The
courts appear prepared to give the states considerable leeway in attempt-
ing to fashion innovative methods for addressing the problems associated
with drug dependency and generally limit themselves to redressing what
they perceive as egregious flaws in these models.
Nevertheless, as a result of this range of views, the judicial response
to DDC can be expected to remain somewhat uncertain and to continue
that extended periods of commitment are only possible through recommitment procedures,
which are, in effect, periodic reviews).
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to evolve. To the extent that treatment response to drug dependency
becomes more certain and predictable, the position of the judiciary re-
garding DDC may also become clearer.
